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Abstract
When natural disasters like floods or droughts happen, people experience their wrath,
losing lives, livelihoods, homes and security. Natural disasters disrupt the status quo,
and create social, humanitarian and political needs. In most cases, people turn to
their governments to provide for these needs. However, governments vary widely
in their ability and willingness to provide for these needs. Citizens evaluate the
outcomes of the government’s actions in response to their needs arising from the
e↵ects of the natural disaster. Much work on the e↵ects of natural disasters has
been undertaken by civil war scholars. This project uniquely contributes to our
understanding of how natural disasters a↵ect political processes by extending the
analysis to the areas of human rights, sub-national social conflict and leadership
duration.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction
When natural disasters like floods or droughts happen, people experience their wrath,
losing lives, livelihoods, homes and security. Disasters disrupt the status quo, and
create social, humanitarian and political needs. In most cases, people turn to their
governments to provide for these needs. However, governments vary widely in their
ability and willingness to provide for these needs. Factors like coastal urbanization
and rapid population growth have put more people in harm’s way and given gov-
ernments a larger audience whose needs must be addressed. The accelerated pace of
occurrences of natural disasters is cause for concern, given the rise in human popula-
tions and the increase in the number of people likely to be a↵ected. All governments
are increasingly pressed to prepare for and respond to natural disasters, as resources
are limited and demand is growing. Citizens evaluate their government’s response to
their needs arising from the e↵ects of the natural disaster.
Not all societies will be able to respond adequately to the challenges posed by events
like droughts, floods, earthquakes and extreme temperatures, and some governments
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do a better job at preparing for and dealing with the consequences of natural disas-
ters. For some societies, natural disasters exact a higher death toll and longer-lasting
problems. While all societies experience natural disasters, their consequences are not
felt evenly.
The ways in which governments respond to natural disasters, and the options for
citizens to evaluate their responses, vary by state capacity, government type, and
disaster characteristics. Some governments are better prepared for natural disasters
and also handle their e↵ects more e ciently and e↵ectively, responding in timely and
comprehensive ways to citizens’ needs. Other societies are less able to prepare suf-
ficiently and intervene after natural disasters. Because governments are di↵erently
willing and able to address natural disasters, the same disaster event will have very
di↵erent consequences for political behavior across societies. Di↵erent disaster types
also require varying levels of willingness and ability. By di↵erentiating the types of
disasters and the number of people who are killed and a↵ected by them, we can bet-
ter understand states’ responses. These concepts are demonstrated by the following
examples in France, Pakistan and Russia.
In June of 1991, Pakistan experienced a serious heat wave which killed hundreds
of people. Some died as a result of heat-related illnesses and dehydration. Others
were a↵ected by secondary causes like food poisoning from unreliable refrigeration.
A continual lack of investment in the nation’s power grid taxed the capacity of the
electrical industry under the searing hot conditions, causing massive power outages
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across the country. Violent protests in the port city of Karachi targeted the o ces of
the local electricity supplier and disrupted daily life by burning tires in the streets,
prompting a repressive response from local police. In the capital, the opposition
party staged nonviolent demonstrations to highlight the current leadership’s short-
comings in responding to the humanitarian needs of Pakistani citizens.
The people of Pakistan want a consistent supply of electricity and relief from the
hot weather. The government is tasked with providing the public infrastructure for
electricity and is responsible for maintaining order. After failing to do so, Pakistanis
demonstrated both violently and nonviolently. Almost twenty years later in 2010,
Pakistan found itself embroiled in a similar situation where rolling blackouts, or
”load-shedding,” fomented discontent and created similar humanitarian emergencies
as were experienced in 1991.
In 2003, the continent of Europe also experienced a heat wave. In France alone,
more than 15,000 people died from heat-related illnesses. The hot weather occurred
during the period of summer vacation which stranded many urban elderly and other
vulnerable people without caregivers or family to look after them. The right-centrist
government blamed families for leaving their relatives unattended; families blamed
the government for failing to adequately provide for public well-being during a crisis.
Following the heat wave, French Health Minister Jean-Francois Mattei resigned his
post. In the 2004 elections, leftist politicians gained seats in previously conservative
regions as voters punished the incumbent party for their apparent complacency and
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inadequacy in dealing with the unusually hot weather the summer before. Most in-
terestingly, the country adopted new legislation to provide a better social safety net
for vulnerable populations.
Contemporaneous with the heat wave and election cycles, French citizens partici-
pated in protests across the country for various reasons, from war opposition to cuts
in social spending. Protest in France is a highly ritualized and legally protected
event, complementary with regular elections, which provides another forum for cit-
izens to evaluate their government’s policy performance. These protests, while not
completely inconsequential, are very di↵erent from the events in Pakistan in the way
they are contextualized within existing political processes.
In the summer of 2010, soaring temperatures and rampant wildfires created envi-
ronmental and humanitarian problems in Russia. While seeking respite from the
heat at the country’s beaches, 1,200 Russians drowned. Smoke from the wildfires
hovered over cities, creating air pollution in the arid conditions and health problems
for citizens. Estimates of total casualties from the heat and pollution that summer
are as high as 56,000. On July 30th, 25 million acres of grain had burned. By August
2nd, the total acres scorched had reached 300,000 million acres.
President Medvedev banned grain exports, driving up global wheat prices. However,
and more importantly, upon seeing the anomalous weather conditions, he signaled
a shift in state policy toward climate change. “What’s happening with the planet’s
4
climate right now,” he spoke on television,“needs to be a wake-up call to all of us,
meaning all heads of state, all heads of social organizations, in order to take a more
energetic approach to countering the global changes to the climate.”
Protests or mass social complaints were scant during the heat and wildfire emer-
gencies in Russia, in large part due to government’s tightened control over media
and public o cials, actively suppressing information and quashing dissent. Yet as
one of the world’s largest contributors to greenhouse gas emissions, Russia’s o cial
response to the demands of natural disasters was to acknowledge the role of global
institutions in helping states solve natural disaster problems as well as the challenges
posed by domestic audience costs by skeptical citizens.
In a stable, democratic country like France which has both political will and in-
frastructural capacity, the domestic political system was robust enough to weather
public discontent through democratic means in spite of the high number of casualties.
In an unstable autocracy like Pakistan, a comparatively low number of casualties re-
sulted in public violence but no policy reforms. Furthermore, in the short- and
long-term, the Pakistani government failed to address the fundamental causes of the
unrest by increasing the nation’s capacity for generating electrical power. By contrast
in Russia, an emerging democracy which experienced by far the largest number of
heat-related casualties, public protest was oddly absent, and the government sought
relief by turning to the international community for help.
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Government type and state capacity matter to the natural disaster narrative because
they determine a country’s approach to disaster preparation and post-hoc responses.
Government type determines a state’s willingness to address natural disaster prob-
lems, and state capacity determines its ability to do so. Governments can be neither
willing nor able, alternately willing and able, or both willing and able to handle po-
litical and social problems posed by natural disasters. States’ willingness and ability
contextualize both their preventive and interventive approaches to natural disasters.
As rational actors, leaders in all states pursue policies that maximize their time
in o ce, including providing both public and private goods to their supporters.
Preparation for and responses to natural disasters are public goods. Democracies
should be more willing than non-democracies to prepare for and respond to citizens’
needs since leaders retain o ce by providing public goods to a large constituency.
Non-democracies, on the other hand, are theoretically under-prepared for natural
disasters and face challenges in responding to citizens’ needs since leaders retain of-
fice by providing private goods to a small coalition of supporters.
However, willingness to respond is only part of the explanation. States’ capac-
ity to respond also matters. State capacity can be understood as a composite of
institutions, economics and infrastructure. States with large economies may lack
political will to respond to natural disasters, but have the capacity to prepare and
respond. These measures vary depending on the type of natural disaster. For exam-
ple, addressing epidemics is di↵erent from addressing earthquakes, yet state capacity
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matters for addressing both. States can address epidemics by vaccinating children
and supporting an adequate level of medical professionals. States can respond to the
threat of earthquakes by maintaining evacuation routes, for example.
The combination of states’ willingness and ability to prepare for and respond to
natural disasters a↵ects their overall vulnerability. Vulnerability refers to the ways
in which states, political processes and citizens are a↵ected by natural disasters.
Natural disasters can make state vulnerable by damaging their social, political and
economic infrastructure, disrupting or destroying centers of production. Leaders of
states are also vulnerable, since they are subject to their citizens’ evaluations of
their performance in o ce. Citizens are also vulnerable to natural disasters, like
being displaced from their homes, facing food insecurity and under certain circum-
stances, oppression by the government.
The types of possible natural disasters characterize the ways in which states can
respond to them. One type includes weather events, like extreme temperatures,
floods, droughts and storms. Another type includes epidemics, insect infestations
and events like landslides and avalanches. A third type includes earthquakes and
volcanoes. While a one-size-fits-all approach toward preparing for and responding
to these types of natural disasters might not work for all states, we can generalize a
state’s overall capacity to respond to these varying events.
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1.2 Contribution to the Literature
This human-environment relationship is not a new research agenda; rather, it has
been the focus of much scholarly investigation already in both the conflict and coop-
eration literature. For example, previous work has examined how natural resources
are used to fund conflicts, and how natural disasters a↵ect conflict likelihood. Other
work has shown how states cooperate over shared natural resources as well as long-
term issues like pollution and climate change. However, in spite of the breadth and
depth of research done, many questions remain regarding political behavior, gover-
nance, and natural disasters, whether related to climate, environment, or geology.
This project looks at some of the under-explored areas of political science scholarship
related to natural disasters and governance, like their e↵ect on the tenure of leaders
in o ce, their e↵ect on human rights, and on social conflict.
In the past decade, scholars have gained access to highly refined data through ge-
ographic information systems (GIS) and sub-regional data on human behavior and
exogenous disaster events which has allowed them to closely model the relationship
between political behavior and disasters. Much of the scholarship on the relationship
between natural disasters and governance has originated in the civil war literature.
This research has been predicated on two fundamental beliefs: that Africa is the
most likely place to experience the deleterious consequences of natural disasters,
specifically those related to climate; and that civil war is a likely outcome. These
assumptions are not entirely baseless, given the governance challenges many African
states face, as well as their existing precarious humanitarian situations, food inse-
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curity and prevalence of conflict. Yet only by expanding the geographic range and
political outcomes can we learn more about how natural disasters a↵ect people and
governments.
This research seeks to extend the scope of analysis beyond Africa and beyond civil
wars to explain the relationship between natural disasters and political processes.
Because of this narrow focus, many interesting questions remain unanswered about
the e↵ect of climate on governance and people. For example, what e↵ect does cli-
mate have on leadership tenure and regime stability? Do natural disasters incite
other domestic reactions that besides civil war, like riots, demonstrations, protests,
revolutions and coups? How do natural disasters a↵ect states’ human rights prac-
tices?
This project seeks to explore these questions, specifically relating natural disasters
to the following: the duration of leaders’ tenure in o ce; states’ likelihood of ex-
periencing an intrastate conflict; the status of human rights practices; and states’
participation in climate and environmental international regimes. By investigating
these relationships, I hope to provide further insight into why, under some conditions,
climate change produces cooperation and conflict under others.
Much of the existing research on environment and political behavior has come from
the civil war literature. Civil war scholars have looked at environmental factors
that initiate and exacerbate intrastate conflicts, including resource scarcity and ex-
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ogenous disaster events like rainfall and earthquakes. This research provides a rich
foundation for continuing to explore other ways that natural disasters a↵ect aspects
of governance.
1.3 The Nature of the Political System
Natural disasters present a problem for governments which is that they are held
accountable for events beyond their control. Unlike war events or economic shocks,
which can be attributed to individual leaders, political systems or specific policies,
natural disasters are not generally a result of government policies. Earthquakes,
extreme temperatures, the amount of rainfall whether scarce or plentiful, and other
disaster events are not controlled by governments. Their e↵ects, however, are contex-
tualized by the society in which they occur. Flooding can be mitigated by land-use
policies, including building levees and dams, and exacerbated by deforestation. Epi-
demics are more devastating in countries where fewer people are vaccinated and with
fewer medical personnel per capita. Electrical generation which fuels indoor heating
and cooling helps alleviate the e↵ects of extreme hot and cold temperatures. The
political demand for these provisions varies by government type, and the ability to
provide them varies by state capacity.
Collier & Hoe✏er (2005) specifically argue that government type matters to a state’s
strategy for dealing with resource conflicts for domestic accountability to its con-
stituents, the source of its legitimacy, and the range of policy tools at its dispense for
relating to its citizens. Gleditsch & Ward (1997) note that democracies are marked
by active citizen participation, regular and meaningful electoral competition, protec-
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tion of civil and legal rights, liberal economies and focus on human rights. Thies
(2010) proposes that state capacity, viewed as the ability of the state to raise funds
through taxation, conditions governments’ approaches to handling crises like natural
disasters or civil wars.
Natural disasters are economically and politically costly. States must pay for these
costs, and the variety of tools which they have at their disposal varies depending on
whether that state is a democracy or not (Cohen & Werker, 2008). Consequently,
it follows that the options for citizens to evaluate the e↵ectiveness and responsive-
ness of their government also varies according to the political opportunity structures
therein. In other words, in some states, citizens evaluate their government’s per-
formance through elections, and on other states, evaluation happens in the streets.
Elections and demonstrations are not necessarily mutually exclusive, nor are they
isolated to particular societies. However, the political consequences of contentious
behavior do vary by society.
Governments vary in their provision of public goods. Because leaders of democratic
states are accountable to a large constituency, they have an incentive to distribute
public goods widely. These public goods may take many forms, like investment in
infrastructure and social services. Democratic governments also have stronger do-
mestic institutions than do non-democracies. These flexible and responsive domestic
institutions allow democracies to weather the e↵ects of natural disasters without in-
curring a systemic breakdown.
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In democracies, public funds may be allocated to build or repair infrastructure like
levees, to compensate cities and citizens for economic losses, or provide emergency
services like evacuation or protection (Healy & Malhotra, 2009). Democracies pro-
vide these goods with funds from popular taxation. With higher taxation rates there
is a also an accompanying popular mandate for distributive policies. Thus, citizens
in democratic states expect that government will utilize public funds for public funds
for public problems. Citizens in autocratic states do not share these same expecta-
tions for benefiting from the provision of the public goods.
Autocracies, which provide comparatively fewer public goods than democracies, are
less likely to allocate national resources to address the consequences of natural disas-
ters. Autocracies generally spend less per capita on public goods than democracies
do. Because leaders of autocracies remain in power by providing private goods to
a small group of supporters, they should be less inclined to use their own domes-
tic resources to provide for the public well-being following natural disasters as this
would dilute the pool of resources available to ply their supporters for continued
tenure in o ce. Autocracies’ extractive capacity, i.e. their ability to obtain rev-
enue from taxation from their citizens, tends to be less fruitful than in democracies.
1 As a consequence, citizens have less financial investment in their state. States
may be more inclined to o↵er international assistance to victims of natural disasters
1A future theoretical area of exploration is the subset of countries reliant on natural resource
rents like oil as a major component of their national income. These countries often fall into the
“unwilling but able” category.
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in non-democracies as an expression of outreach and sympathy for their su↵ering as
a result of the disaster and their su↵ering under a leader unwilling to help her people.
State capacity is distinct from political will. It encompasses states’ budgets priori-
tizing disaster prevention and intervention. States with sizable economies may theo-
retically be able to address their citizens’ needs, like public health provision through
vaccinations, emergency response infrastructure, and compensation for losses, but
ability does not ensure action. The source of state revenue, like resource rents, trade
in primary commodities, or from popular taxation, determines the size of the pool
of resources available for expenditures on disaster mitigation.
In summary, the political e↵ects of natural disasters are conditioned both on regime
type and on state capacity. States having varying degrees of willingness and ability
to both prepare for and address the consequences of natural disasters.
1.4 Leadership tenure
The central question of this chapter addresses how changing environmental condi-
tions a↵ect leaders tenure in o ce. Leaders are subject to their citizens’ periodic
evaluations of their performance, and natural disasters provide opportunities for cit-
izens to reward their leaders with extended tenure in o ce or punish them with
removal from o ce.
Natural disasters create unforeseen costs to states, both those that are compara-
tively well- and ill-prepared. Leaders in states experiencing natural disasters ought
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to be concerned about their tenure in o ce, since leaders that fail to e↵ectively ad-
dress these face removal from power. Natural disasters can create both immediate
social needs which citizens expect their leaders to address through political mecha-
nisms, and longer-term needs that have more durable e↵ects. Natural disasters can
disrupt and destroy aspects of a state’s economic sectors, especially agriculture, and
as such can have multiplicative e↵ects on leaders’ time in o ce. In other words,
citizens evaluate leaders’ direct responses to natural disasters as well as punishing or
rewarding them for the economic conditions that follow.
Leaders are rational actors who seek to maximize their time in o ce. Democratic
and autocratic leaders have di↵erent mechanisms for maintaining power. Leaders in
democracies stay in o ce by providing public goods to a large constituency; leaders
in autocracies stay in o ce by providing private benefits to a small constituency
(Mesquita et al., 2002). Leaders in democracies and autocracies also have di↵erent
term limitations, as determined by their respective political institutions and the con-
stituency on whom they depend for ratifying their leadership. The length of demo-
cratic leaders’ tenure is generally shorter than that of their autocratic counterparts.
Democratic and non-democratic leadership transitions have dissimilar characteris-
tics. Democracies are marked by regular, competitive and fair electoral systems.
Leaders of democracies are more likely to respond more quickly to natural disasters
because they are accountable to inflexible election timelines, whereas autocrats are
more likely to hedge their bets on retaining o ce and wait out natural disasters.
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Previous research on regime tenure has found that natural natural disasters do a↵ect
leadership duration. Zhang et al. (2007a) examined several centuries of conflict and
climate data in China. They find a strong relationship between onset of cold spells,
dynastic change and number of wars. They note that,“Although cold phases re-
duced agricultural yields, the outbreaks of warfare generally lagged behind the onset
of cooling because of social bu↵ers (i.e., granary storage).” They found that in China,
most of the dynastic collapses and changes happened following cold phases. Zhang
et al. (2007b) extended this analysis to Europe and found a similar relationship dur-
ing the Little Ice Age. It is noteworthy that variations in climate patterns happen
along a continuum, like increased and decreased temperatures and rainfalls, at times
producing floods or droughts and ensuing famines and crop failures. In the case of
the e↵ects of the Little Ice Age on China and Europe, lower temperatures created
conditions for social tensions and regime instability rather than higher temperatures.
The work of Zhang and Lee demonstrates an empirical relationship between disas-
ters and regime stability, and a natural starting point to question how post-industrial
and post-institutional society di↵ers from previous eras. The dense international net-
work of institutional ”safety nets” provides states with more options for managing
domestic crises, as do technological advances, that can help states mitigate negative
consequences, like civil disturbances or loss of leadership (Midlarsky, 1998). The
discipline would benefit from contemporary analysis of the e↵ects of natural disas-
ters on leadership tenure, extending the types of natural disasters beyond extreme
temperatures to include more phenomena.
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1.5 Contentious Behavior
This chapter examines the ways in which natural disasters impact states’ likelihood
for experiencing contentious behavior, like protests, demonstrations, strikes and rev-
olutions. Contemporary scholarship has explored sub-national conflict in the form of
civil wars. Scholars have explored variations in the measurement of conflicts and the
types of environmental concerns that states face, from dependence on primary com-
modities vulnerable to looting, to temperature fluctuations and rainfall deviations.
Civil war as an outcome has received the most attention
The operationalization of intrastate conflict matters to the results. A dichotomous
variable that measures presence or onset of civil war fails to capture some of the im-
portant behaviors that fail to meet the arbitrary thresholds set, whether at more than
twenty-five or more than one hundred battle deaths. I propose using a measure that
captures types of intrastate conflict, ranging from low-level domestic disturbances
like protests and demonstrations to more violent incidents like riots and revolutions.
To most accurately make claims about the e↵ect of natural disasters on contentious
behavior, it is important to consider a range of potential outcomes.
This chapter contributes to the scholarship on climate and governance by specifying
the dependent variable as a range of values describing contentious domestic behavior
including protests, riots, strikes and revolutions (Ai & Norton, 2003). As previously
discussed, because Africa is rife with intractable civil wars and myriad social prob-
lems, researchers have rightly focused on seeking explanations for the intensity and
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durability of the conflicts there. Many of the explanations of African civil wars have
included poor governance and weak institutions, economic shocks, and recently, the
e↵ects of climate on crop yields and food prices. Yet while most attention has been
focused on using variables to understand civil wars on that continent these factors
are not unique to explaining problems in Africa.
The most recent research on climate and conflict utilizes geospatial climate models
to estimate the amount of rainfall. These studies have focused exclusively on Africa.
Hendrix & Glaser (2007) asked if extreme weather events exert a significant influ-
ence on political disturbances and social conflict, and whether these forms of conflict
could potentially destabilize the government order. They examine five mechanisms
through which hydro-meteorological disasters may lead to socio-political conflict: wa-
ter access, price disputes, migration, state intervention and natural disasters. Using
the Social Conflict in Africa Database, they find a positive curvilinear relationship
between rainfall deviation and social protest. Further, and importantly, they find
that both wetter and drier years are associated with an increase in social protest.
Burke et al. (2010) use rainfall as an instrumental variable for economic growth in 41
African countries and find that weather shocks do a↵ect civil conflict, but through
the mechanism of economic growth. They find that a negative growth shock of five
percentage points increases the likelihood of conflict by one-half the following year.
One of the strongest declarations of the relationship between climate and conflict
using GIS technology is from the research of Burke et al. (2009a) who find that in
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the Sahel, temperature and rainfall norm deviation predicts onset of civil war. An
immediate refutation of this work from Buhaug (2010) challenges the former’s con-
clusions on methodological grounds. Still, this strand of research sets the threshold
of conflict at civil war, which likely misses less organized contentious politics and
regime stability, and does not capture the range of possible outcomes of changing
environmental conditions on human behavior by narrowly focusing only on the Sahel.
One reason given for focusing on Africa is the preponderance of people reliant on sub-
sistence agriculture, which makes them particularly vulnerable to changes in weather
and climate. Agriculture plays a key role in understanding how natural disasters in-
fluence contentious behavior. When natural disasters disrupt food production or
distribution, events like food riots become more likely. To investigate only African
countries misses the full range of possibilities and potential explanations for how
natural disasters a↵ect states and the people within them.
For this reason, I believe it is imperative to take a global perspective on this problem,
including the e↵ect of natural disasters within the international system on individ-
ual countries. Global natural disasters that disrupt the production and distribution
of food can create opportunities for contentious behaviors in countries with mild or
minimal exposure to natural disasters. For example, the wildfires in Russia and Aus-
tralia increased the global prices of wheat, which created economic stress on other
countries leading to local protests over increased food prices.
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Investigating other potential sources of contentious behavior, like revolution, rebel-
lion, civil war, demonstrations and coups, Lichbach (1989) asserts that the economic
inequality contributions to political conflict. Oberschall (1978) discusses two theo-
ries of when social conflict will happen: the breakdown-frustration approach, and the
mobilization-solidarity approach. Conflict resulting from natural disasters is likely
of the breakdown-frustration ilk. This theory is built upon the approach taken by
Gurr (1968) toward relative deprivation, whereby citizens seek redress of social in-
equalities by enacting concerted campaigns of contentious behavior. The relative
deprivation in the natural disasters scenario is rooted in the inability of governments
to adequately respond to the magnitude of the disaster with adequate social relief,
and the inability of citizens to meet their basic daily security needs of food, shelter
and security. Social inequality and relative deprivation have featured prominently in
explaining the presence of contentious behavior, and there is good reason to believe
that natural disasters highlight and exacerbate these problems.
Democracies may be as likely as non-democracies to experience contentious behav-
ior, like demonstrations and protests, following a perceived inadequate government
response to a natural disaster. However, the outcome of the contentious behavior will
be di↵erent for democracies; it is less likely that protests will devolve into a deeper
conflict or become a major political cleavage within society. In autocracies, protests
over government responses to natural disasters may ignite existing discontent and
drive a deeper wedge into a longstanding social cleavage. A government’s response
to a natural disaster may give an aggrieved group a reason to mobilize.
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1.6 Human Rights
This chapter extends the analysis of the e↵ects of natural disasters to look at the
human rights conditions and practices in countries experiencing natural disasters.
Natural disasters can negatively e↵ect the protection of human rights in two ways.
Basic human rights, as protected under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
include the right to food and shelter Assembly (1948). First, following natural disas-
ters, these human rights may be the first casualties as disasters often deprive people
of access to food and displace them from their homes. Second, natural disasters can
exacerbate existing social conflicts or provoke new ones. Human rights, like freedom
from oppression or persecution, may be threatened when natural disasters happen
since governments can opportunistically violate the rights of marginalized or oppo-
sition groups, for example.
These two types of human rights are very di↵erent in nature, the former being passive
and the latter being active. Deprivation of basic human rights like food and shelter
does not necessarily indicate a government’s endorsement of policies that make such
violations possible since natural disasters create dire humanitarian circumstances
which even the best prepared governments can struggle to address. Alternately, gov-
ernments may deny humanitarian relief or adequate responses to marginalized groups
in society or those not necessary for their continued tenure in o ce. However, active
violation of human rights through extrajudicial killings, or imprisonment for politi-
cal reasons, may indicate that the government is utilizing the natural disaster as an
opportunity to commit these crimes.
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Natural disasters may not a↵ect all members of society equally. Already vulnerable
populations, like political, ethic and religious minorities, have less access to social
protection and may lack formal channels for redress of grievances. Their pre-existing
precarious social positions may put them more at risk for experiencing both the ill
e↵ects of natural disasters and for opportunistic repression by their government. As
yet, however, the relationship between natural disasters and both types of respect
for human rights is unspecified. Protection of basic human rights, like access to food
and shelter, are likely to su↵er in all countries experiencing natural disasters. How-
ever, democracies should have better human rights practices than non-democracies
which are more susceptible to abusing human rights because they lack democratic in-
stitutions that would preclude worsening of human rights practices (Francisco, 1995).
Democracies and non-democracies vary in their preparation for natural disasters,
including policies to mitigate their severity like immunizing children, building levees
and maintaining roads for evacuation. Higher-order human rights protection, like
freedom from oppression, may falter following natural disasters as governments seize
opportunities to repress minority groups, for example. A rigorous analysis of the
relationship between natural disasters and human rights practices should provide
important insight into the circumstances under which people are most vulnerable.
1.7 Conclusions
Natural disasters likely to a↵ect all states in the international system. Natural disas-
ters are costly in economic, humanitarian and political terms, and disrupt the status
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quo when they occur. States have vary in their willingness and ability to address
natural disasters both in terms of preventive and compensatory measures. Natural
disasters contribute to state vulnerability in several ways, including impacting their
economy, a↵ecting leaders’ tenure in o ce, making contentious behavior possible,
and creating conditions that worsen citizens’ human rights, like access to food and
housing.
This work builds on the civil war literature, which has laid the foundation for un-
derstanding how natural disasters a↵ect political behavior. The empirical chapters
extend the analysis to include contentious behavior, human rights violations, and
leadership tenure. The subsequent chapters include empirical evaluations of these
political phenomena.
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Chapter 2
POLITICAL BEHAVIOR AND NATURAL
DISASTERS
2.1 The political consequences of natural disasters
“Disasters are more than extraordinary physical events; they attain hu-
man significance through the sociopolitical contexts in which they occur
(Davis & Seitz, 1982).”
Natural disasters like droughts, extreme temperatures and floods destroy crops, in-
frastructure and homes. They create panic, instability and uncertainty, and disrupt
the status quo in society. People look to their government to respond to their needs,
and they evaluate their leaders’ and government’s responses to natural disasters.
People reward and punish their leaders for their disaster-related policies and re-
sponses. Natural disasters can provoke civil unrest as well. Natural disasters happen
in all societies, but their e↵ects are not uniformly felt. Some states are less equipped
to deal with destructive natural forces and aftermath. States vary widely in their
disaster preparation plans, provision of public goods, government types, institutions
and infrastructure, geographic location and economic sectors.
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States vary in their willingness and ability to respond to natural disasters, based
on the type of government in power and the resources available for them to invest
in disaster prevention and response. A state’s willingness is determined by the type
of government in power, and the size of the constituency leaders are accountable to.
A state’s ability is determined by its economy and domestic institutions. Willing-
ness and ability a↵ect states’ vulnerability to the political consequences of natural
disasters. In this chapter I present a theory of how natural disasters a↵ect political
behavior in the international system. First I describe states’ willingness and ability,
and how the outcomes of these terms influence the ways in which natural disasters
di↵erently a↵ect states. Then I address the scope of natural disasters, including
their types and characteristics. Then I present the ways that states’ varying willing-
ness and abilities create di↵erent political vulnerabilities, including regime stability,
contentious behavior, and protection of human rights.
2.2 Natural disasters make states and people vulnerable
Natural disasters can displace people from their homes and decrease the availability
of food, a↵ect their livelihoods, and make their physical security more precarious.
Natural disasters create many levels of vulnerability for citizens, leaders and states.
Countries are vulnerable as disasters destroy infrastructure and states’ economic en-
gines, like industry and agriculture. As chief policymakers, leaders and heads-of-state
are vulnerable to citizen evaluations of their performance following natural disasters.
A state’s vulnerability to natural disasters depends on its willingness and ability to
prepare for and respond to events like floods, extreme temperatures and earthquakes.
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Natural disasters are both politically and economically costly events. Natural dis-
asters can destroy components of states’ economic sectors, like infrastructure for
production of goods as well as crops for consumption and export. They also destroy
homes and disrupt the lives of economically productive workers, contributing to a
decline in both personal income and state wealth. Natural disasters are politically
costly for leaders who are responsible for the policies that contextualize the states’
preparation for and mitigation of natural disasters, as well as the disbursement of
funds for compensation and reconstruction after such events.
Two key determining factors influence how states manage natural disasters: gov-
ernment type, and state capacity. Political willingness is a function of government
type, whether the state is democratic or not. The relative ability to cope with
climate-related natural disasters can be understood in terms of state capacity, the
strength to weather economic shocks created by natural disasters.
The outcomes of natural disasters are conditioned on the responses of the govern-
ment of the state in which they occur. In “Markets and States in Tropical Africa,”
Robert Bates describes the predicament of growth and development in Africa, re-
lated to weather and climate as well as the roles of marketing boards and government
policies on production, prices, development and political institutions (Bates, 2005).
Droughts and famines are mitigated by good government policies and worsened by
market ine ciencies, privileging certain social or political groups, and investing in
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primary commodities rather than on higher value products in the market chain. The
reach and devastation of natural disasters is strongly dependent on the capacity of
states to “weather the weather.” Bates’ describes problems in tropical Africa, but as
I demonstrate here, the argument is applicable worldwide.
A state’s willingness is determined by its government type. Democracies should be
more willing than non-democracies to address problems related to natural disasters.
A state’s ability is determined by its economic ability to prepare for and respond to
natural disasters. States can have either high or low capacity and high or low will-
ingness to respond to natural disasters. States with both high willingness and ability
are likely to have the following characteristics: robust, diverse economies; high per
capita income; fair, participatory, and regular elections; and competent emergency
intervention infrastructure. States with both low willingness and ability tend to be
primary commodity exporters, and have low per capita income, weak electoral in-
stitutions, and weak emergency intervention infrastructure. A state’s capacity, its
willingness and ability to address the consequences of natural disasters, characterizes
their vulnerability to these events.
States can show vulnerability to natural disasters in several ways. For example,
they can su↵er long and short-term economic losses, political instability, contentious
behavior or conflict. A state with both high willingness and high ability to address
the consequences of natural disasters is likely to have a lower vulnerability to them,
as outlined in Table 2.1. States with low willingness and ability are likely to have
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a high vulnerability to natural disasters. States with alternately low and high will-
ingness and ability have a medium risk of vulnerability. In other words, states who
possess and act on their capacity to prepare for and weather the e↵ects of natural
disasters should be less vulnerable to devastating economic losses, to political insta-
bility, to conflict or contentious behavior. States’ vulnerability can change over time,
as government types change and economies evolve, and as more natural disasters
a↵ecting more people happen worldwide.
Conversely, states with low willingness and ability are more vulnerable to economic,
political and conflict problems created by natural disasters. Vulnerability is not nec-
essarily a foregone conclusion, however. 1
Table 2.1. Willingness, Ability and Vulnerability
Willingness Ability Vulnerability Examples
High High Low United States, France
High Low Medium Singapore, Netherlands
Low High Medium China, Russia
Low Low High North Korea, Sudan, Haiti, Pakistan
1States with low willingness and ability to cope with natural disasters can o↵set their vulnera-
bility by soliciting international humanitarian and economic assistance. Future research can pursue
the mitigating e↵ects of humanitarian assistance on states’ vulnerabilities.
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States with high willingness and ability have low vulnerability to the negative ef-
fects of natural disasters because they have the political incentive to respond to their
citizens needs and the resources to provide for them. Countries with neither the
willingness nor the ability to accommodate the threats posed by natural disasters
have high vulnerability as they lack both the incentive and the resources to address
problems created by natural disasters. For countries with either willingness or abil-
ity, government type should be more important than state capacity. States with the
political will to address natural disasters have the motivation to seek the resources
to address disaster-related problems.
In the next sections, I will discuss in more depth the ways in which government
type and state capacity a↵ect states’ willingness and ability to address problems
posed by natural disasters.
2.3 Willingness
Natural disasters disrupt the status quo and create public emergencies. People often
lack the ability to care for themselves when faced with natural disasters; in these
instances, they look to their government to provide collective goods. Government
type conditions a state’s willingness to respond to natural disasters. Democracies
should be better than non-democracies at both disaster preparation and response.
As compared to autocracies, democracies are better at providing public goods, like
security and infrastructure (Boix, 1999).
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The accountability leaders feel to their constituents can be characterized in terms
of both the selectorate and the winning coalition (Mesquita et al., 2002). The se-
lectorate refers to the part of the population eligible to participate in selection of
leaders, and the winning coalition is a subset of the winning coalition necessary
for a leader to gain or remain in power. In democracies, the selectorate and win-
ning coalition are roughly equal in size. In other words, leaders must appeal to
the median voter and pursue policies which benefit the greatest number of people
to achieve or maintain political o ce. However, in non-democracies, leaders may
ignore the demands of a significant proportion of the population because they can
remain in power by appeasing a much smaller winning coalition with private benefits.
This means that for disaster preparation and response, democracies should be better
prepared because they are perpetually beholden to a larger constituency to provide
public goods. Moreover, these public goods, like roads, infrastructure, electricity
generation, public services like health care and security, are not unique to disaster
preparation and response, but rather provide a robust existing social “safety net” for
the circumstances when natural disasters do occur.
Collier & Hoe✏er (2005) specifically argue that government type matters to a state’s
strategy for dealing with resource conflicts through domestic accountability to its
constituents. In a democracy, legitimate governance is ratified through widespread
political participation, through active and competitive recruitment of the executive
o ceholder, o cial term limits, and the presence of open elections. Gleditsch &
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Ward (1997) note that democracies are marked by active citizen participation, regu-
lar and meaningful electoral competition, protection of civil and legal rights, liberal
economies and focus on human rights. Governments calculate their disaster responses
giving consideration to their political costs. Broad domestic political costs like those
characteristic of democracies dissuade governments from pursuing policies that lead
to suboptimal social and humanitarian outcomes, like human rights violations.
Leaders with a strong incentive to provide public goods, i.e. democratic states, dif-
fer from non-democratic states which have comparatively less incentive. Democrats
are reliant on a responsive and active selectorate to remain in o ce, and seek their
approval through public policies that benefit many. Autocrats and leaders of non-
democracies, on the other hand, are more empowered to ignore the problems facing
large swaths of the population since their priority is to maintain the support of their
winning coalition. Furthermore, autocrats can be said to act rationally by denying
the provision of public goods following a natural disaster because doing so dilutes
the pool of available resources necessary for appeasing their winning coalition and
by extension, remaining in power.
Rarely is it clearer to people whether or not their leaders are attending to their
needs than in the time during and following a natural disaster. Following Hurricane
Katrina in 2006, many residents in states along the Gulf of Mexico cost criticized the
government’s response, including evacuation measures and provisions for those un-
able to leave, assistance from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA),
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and conduct of law enforcement o cials in the immediate aftermath. This disaster
highlighted many institutional shortcomings, including insu cient levees, inadequate
temporary housing, and civil and human rights violations rep (2006). Tens of thou-
sands of people were relocated to cities throughout the United States, including
Houston, Memphis, Denver and Jackson, Mississippi. In the subsequent local and
state elections, many politicians’ careers ended when remaining residents voted them
out of o ce (Malhotra & Kuo, 2008).
Fifteen years earlier in 1991, the extreme heat in Pakistan demonstrates similar
shortcomings, with di↵erent outcomes. Hundreds of people died and many thou-
sands more were a↵ected by the heat wave. Their su↵ering was not alleviated by the
government which had failed to invest in its electrical grid, despite both an increase
in population and demand for power. Stretched beyond its capacity, the electri-
cal infrastructure was stretched beyond its capacity and resulted in power failures.
The people, angry at the government’s intransigence, demonstrated outside the lo-
cal power plants and in the capital city. Other examples of contentious behavior
resulting from natural disasters include food riots, where crop failures can lead to
increased food prices if not met with government support. 2
2High-profile natural disasters do create a sense of urgency for international responses, like the
tsunamis in Indonesia and Southeast Asia in 2004, Haiti in 2010 and Japan in 2011. Countries also
routinely send humanitarian assistance for less visible disasters, like droughts, floods and epidemics.
International assistance can serve to o↵set the political consequences which states may face absent
such aid, as the donors subsidize the government’s financial responsibility out of humanitarian
concern for those a↵ected (Cohen & Werker, 2008).
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The case of Singapore provides a useful contrast. While some disaster prevention and
mitigation can be quite costly, like investing in increased electricity generation, other
forms are relatively simple and require little more than political will. Implementing
vector control to thwart the spread of Dengue fever involves educating people to wear
clothing that covers exposed skin, using mosquito netting and deet, and eliminating
the habitats where disease-carrying mosquitos thrive. In 2005, nearly 14,000 people
were infected with Dengue fever in Singapore, and 19 died. Local o cials held town
meetings, enforced high fines for failing to remove standing water, enacted public
awareness campaigns, and increased the budget for clearing storm drains from $2.5
million to $7.5 million. They also enlisted the help of girl scouts nicknamed “mozzie
busters” as well as a “weekend blitz” of more than 700 trained o cers to help iden-
tify problem areas and raise awareness (Koh et al., 2008). These e↵ective measures
require more political will than state capacity.
On the other hand, governments may delay preventative measures to thwart fu-
ture problems related to natural disasters because the expected gain on returns in
public infrastructure are not strong enough (Achen et al., 2004). In systems where
the leaders only depend on the support of a small audience to remain in power, there
is a disincentive to provide public benefits through disaster relief and compensation.
Leaders may also delay their response and hold out for international hand-outs. With
regard to disaster preparation, an ounce of prevention is not always worth a pound of
cure. Initial research on disaster preparedness indicates that while preventive mea-
sures are cost-e↵ective, they are ranked low amongst constituent priorities (Achen
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et al., 2004). On the other hand, post-hoc expenditures are regarded as very impor-
tant and help citizens evaluate their leaders policy performance.
Similarly, governments may choose not to respond at all to natural disasters for
the same expected utility reasons. If the disaster happens to a constituent group not
essential to their tenure in o ce or in power, they may lack an incentive to respond
at all. If natural disasters help to displace, marginalize or disempower an opposition
group, the government in power could justify a null response. A government may also
choose not to respond because they do not have the requisite resources to address the
range of problems nor the political will to do so. The North Korean famine during
the 1990s exemplifies this situation. In a country of 22 million people, between one
and three million people died from preventable hunger-related illnesses with multiple
origins. These include an economic downturn and social austerity measures, suscep-
tibility to flooding due to deforestation, destruction of grain storages, and inability
of the central government to implement palliative policies.
Government leaders may blame the preceding leadership for failure to adequately
prepare for or respond to natural disasters. Opposition parties or factions may
blame majority parties for the same reason, as well as to capitalize on political op-
portunities that natural disasters present. These opportunities include articulating
grievances and mobilizing their constituency. Most interestingly, governments also
blame their own people for the aftermath of natural disasters. Following the 2003
summer heat wave in France where more than 15,000 people died, the incumbent
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government blamed French families for going on vacation to the beaches and country-
side and leaving their vulnerable elderly family members at home in the cities, many
without air conditioning or access to public places to seek refuge (Poumadre et al.,
2005). French voters harshly rejected this criticism and swiftly voted out of o ce
many incumbent representatives from conservative parties in favor of more liberal
leadership that subsequently passed comprehensive legislation extending protection
against natural disasters to vulnerable members of society like the elderly.
Russian o cials blamed the deaths of their constituents during the heat wave and
wildfires during the summer of 2010 on drinking and drowning while seeking refuge
at the beaches. Similarly, the early 2012 cold wave which a↵ected northern Europe
and Eastern bloc countries has elicited equivalent blame. Ukrainian o cials faulted
their intoxicated constituents for cold-related deaths (Elder & Elder, 2010). The
Russian and Ukranian cases have not unfolded like the French case did, where citi-
zens became outraged by the audacity of government in blaming them rather than
assuming responsibility themselves. While blame may be a quick and cheap strategy
for governments, it is neither a solution to the problem nor uniformly e↵ective in
sating the public’s needs following natural disasters.
If, during the course of the natural disaster or the government’s response to it,
the integrity of civil or political rights is violated, people may seek redress of their
grievances through the courts. In states with an independent judiciary, this is a
viable strategy. States which use their military or police as first responders may
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incur criticism that those responsible for providing security were also perpetrators
of civil or human rights violations. The ability of the judiciary to function as a tool
of redress certainly varies between states, but it can be an e↵ective instrument for
seeking remedy. People may also work through the legislature to develop programs
and laws for responding to natural disasters.
States’ willingness may also be influenced by future repercussions via domestic in-
stitutions like the courts. Leaders of states with an independent judiciary may fear
future punishment so they are more inclined to protect their citizens’ basic human
rights. For leaders of states without an independent judiciary to uphold the rule of
law and the rights of citizens, leaders have little reason to fear future repercussions
from failing to protect, or outright violating, citizens’ human rights following natural
disasters.
Flexible and responsive domestic institutions allow democracies to su↵er the e↵ects
of natural disasters without incurring a systemic breakdown. The types of responses
that governments choose, and the ways in which citizens evaluate their government’s
responses, are both determined by states’ willingness and ability. For example, it
would be very unusual to witness a coup in a democratic country following natural
disasters, since robust and well-functioning institutions should provide for the public
good and address people’s immediate and long-term needs, as well as provide formal
institutional mechanisms through elections and the court system to hold leaders ac-
countable.
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Non-democracies are often characterized by incoherent and inconsistent application
of institutional procedures. These states may face coordination problems or have
allegiances to their core supporters which either encourage or discourage providing
assistance to those a↵ected, especially if theory are from a minority group. Since
democratic leaders are accountable to a wide constituency, while non-democratic
leaders are accountable to a smaller constituency, provision of assistance following
natural disasters is highly dependent on the state’s characteristics. In states where
natural disasters exacerbate existing grievances, the political opportunities for polit-
ical entrepreneurs may include a coup d’etat, suspension of elections or issuance of
a general state of emergency that empowers the current leader with more autonomy
or authority.
2.4 Ability
State capacity characterizes the ways that governments approach their strategies
for managing the demands of climate-related natural disasters. There are several
critical components of state capacity: economic size and diversity; military profes-
sionalization; and domestic institutions. State capacity is di↵erent from government
type as it defines a country’s ability to respond to natural disasters. State capacity
and government type are often grouped through terms like “liberal democracy,” and
while related, these two concepts are distinct. States vary in their capacity both to
prepare for and respond to natural disasters. These two concepts - preparation and
intervention - are related. States with strong capacity are likely to both prepare and
respond better to natural disasters than those with weak capacity. Leaders must
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best decide how to allocate scarce resources toward both preparation and response,
and leaders accountable to a large constituency are more likely than leaders with a
small coalition of supporters to invest in public preventative measures.
Countries with strong state capacity to respond to these problems tend to protect
property rights, heed the demands of their constituency, have sophisticated domestic
disaster management plans as well as formal means of providing immediate human-
itarian assistance and long-term compensation through legitimate legal, social and
political channels. These countries tend to be proactive in their approaches to ad-
dressing natural disasters by investing in public infrastructure like levees, bridges,
dams, irrigation and canals, as well as providing safety nets like governmentally-
supported crop insurance. Countries with strong state capacity tend to be institu-
tionally robust and politically accountable, highly responsive and flexible in their
ability to absorb exogenous shocks.
Countries with weak state capacity, on the other hand, tend to lack these responsive
institutional instruments. Countries characterized by corruption and lack of political
accountability, an unskilled or partisan military, commodity-driven economies and
underinvestment in public infrastructure have fewer adequate resources for respond-
ing to climate-related natural disasters. They also have a lesser incentive to make
long-term investments in the public infrastructure sphere which might help to mit-
igate some of the negative consequences of natural disasters. Governments of this
variety tend to appeal to international humanitarian agencies and individual donor
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countries for both emergency and ongoing monetary and agricultural assistance.
While countries with strong state capacity can e↵ectively manage climate-related
externalities independently, countries with weak state capacity often seek external
help to subsidize their own shortcomings.
Some governments have the economic power to absorb the shock of natural dis-
asters, and others do not (Miguel et al., 2004). Economic power describes the size
of the economy and its diversity. States with substantial manufacturing capacity,
skilled workers and robust trade will be better able to respond to natural disasters
with their own resources, relative to those states with smaller economies dependent
on primary commodities. Alternately, states may seek help from allies, neighbors
or the international community, essentially “borrowing” capacity from the help of
international institutions or sympathetic governments.
The size of the economy matters as states with large economies will be less vulnera-
ble to exogenous weather shocks than smaller economies (Hendrix, 2010). Following
the 2008 earthquake in China, several corporations in the United States o↵ered to
send tents to people displaced from their homes. While this was a sincere gesture
of goodwill, it paled in comparison to China’s domestic response which entailed in-
creasing domestic production and distribution of tents. In other words, China did
not need the humanitarian responses o↵ered by other countries and companies, as
its own resources were more than su cient to address its citizens’ needs.
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The source of national revenue generation also matters. Natural disasters are public
emergencies that require coordination and response en masse. To prevent negative
social, humanitarian and political consequences, governments can e↵ectively and ef-
ficiently respond to natural disasters by allocating public funding to relief e↵orts and
compensation. The central government is the agent which has the authority to pro-
vide public benefits to citizens. Most states require some form of popular taxation
which, in times of duress, people expect should be used to provide for the common
welfare. Taxation explains in part the expectations that people feel toward govern-
ment assistance following natural disasters. Citizens look for a return on their tax
contributions, which the government provides through allocation of public resources
to disaster prevention and responses.
Under ideal circumstances, when natural disasters happen, governments would show
appropriate stewardship of public resources accumulated through taxation and al-
locate funding to assist the victims. This could mean compensation for economic
losses, assistance with transitional housing or relocation, provision of humanitarian
goods like food, water and medical assistance, provision of police or military per-
sonnel to maintain and establish security and order and assist with evacuation, if
necessary. Good governance related to natural disasters could also mean that gov-
ernments provide adequate preparation and mitigation against eventual problems,
like inoculating against infectious diseases, maintaining adequate medical facilities,
building levees and dykes, maintaining public infrastructure like roads and bridges,
and helping to coordinate emergency disaster response plans.
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States that are unable to economically accommodate the needs created by natu-
ral disasters often seek assistance from other states. Humanitarian aid helps states
o↵set the potential negative consequences that leaders and governments face from
dissatisfied constituents. However, humanitarian assistance does not guarantee that
governments will be insulated from citizen reprisals since relief aid may be distributed
unevenly, or pocketed in the co↵ers of the privileged elite.
In many countries, the military serves as the first responder following natural disas-
ters. Previous scholarship has identified military capabilities as one measure of state
capacity. States with a large but poorly trained and compensated military may be
more likely to use the military for repression rather than as first responders providing
relief. States with a small military may be incapable of responding adequately to
humanitarian emergencies following natural disasters.
State capacity is also the degree to which a state can adequately address the de-
mands and problems incurred as a result of natural disasters, and determines the
depth, magnitude and duration of the e↵ects of natural disasters. People expect
that their government will address their disaster-related problems.
States’ strategies for responding to natural disasters vary widely, especially given
the variation in the provision of public goods like security, social services, public
roads and political support for economic sectors, like agriculture. State capacity
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conditions how states handle preparation for natural disasters, coordination prob-
lems facing responses to natural disasters, and provision of public goods.
The most salient recent example of a state lacking the capacity to address natural
disaster-related problems is the case of Darfur in the Sudan. This issue has received
much attention for the social and humanitarian problems created by natural disas-
ters and exacerbated by weak governance. Drought created crop failures, and people
migrated in search of food security. Sudan’s inability and unwillingness to provide
for and respond to natural disasters has drawn the world’s attention to the plight of
those su↵ering the conditions of famine, displacement and conflict. States with weak
capacity to respond to natural disasters do not have these same strong institutions
to guide them.
2.5 Disaster characteristics
The accelerated pace of occurrences of natural disasters is cause for concern, given
the rise in population numbers and the increase in the number of people likely to
be a↵ected. Not all societies will be able to respond adequately to the challenges
posed by increasingly unpredictable weather patterns. No state is immune to the
consequences of natural disasters, but some societies are better equipped to cope
with their e↵ects. States with larger populations and those experiencing more natu-
ral disasters a↵ecting more people may experience diminishing returns with regards
to their willingness and ability to respond to these events.
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The e↵ects of natural disasters are dependent on individual states’ willingness and
ability to prepare and respond to them. Yet there is reason to believe that states do
not have uniform approaches for dealing with natural disasters. All states are not
equally prone to experiencing all types of natural disasters, so it reasons that states
rationally expend their scarce resources to prepare for the types of natural disas-
ters they are most likely to experience. The characteristics of natural disaster type
matter, since a state’s environmental endowments and predisposition to particular
disaster events help determine its approaches to dealing with problems associated
with them as well.
In this project I evaluate the e↵ects of floods, storms, droughts, extreme temper-
atures epidemics and earthquakes. These disasters kill and a↵ect the most people
annually worldwide, and they account for the majority of natural disasters that oc-
cur. These disasters often have interrelated e↵ects: a drought may be caused by
extreme temperatures, and floods can precipitate outbreaks of epidemics like dengue
fever or cholera. Table 2.2 shows the criteria I used in determining which natural
disasters to include.
Natural disasters have important distinguishing features that contribute to the way
they a↵ect societies. These include the type, frequency, scope, onset, duration, reach,
and location of the disaster. Previous research on the e↵ect of natural disasters on
conflict behavior has asked whether natural disasters happen disproportionately to
lower-income countries (Davis & Seitz, 1982). As a starting point, this is a logical
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Table 2.2. E↵ects of natural disasters
What kind of natural disaster? (Type)
How often does it happen? (Frequency)
How many people are a↵ected? (Scope)
How quickly does the disaster happen? (Onset)
How lasting are the e↵ects? (Duration)
How widely felt are the e↵ects (global, local)? (Reach)
What economic sectors are a↵ected? (Sector)
Where is the natural disaster? (Location)
question, since the political, economic and humanitarian consequences of natural
disasters are often more severe in lower-income and developing countries that lack
the willingness and/or ability to prepare and respond to them. However, this does
not mean that higher-income and developed countries are immune to disasters’ ill
e↵ects, as seen in the cases of Hurricane Katrina in the United States and the French
heat wave of 2003.
Much scholarly work has treated all natural disasters as a set of similar events with
little theoretical distinctions between them, even though there is reason to believe
that they have important categorical di↵erences (Nel & Righarts, 2008). I examine
the e↵ects of the most frequently occurring natural disasters and those that kill and
a↵ect the most people. These include floods, droughts, storms, extreme hot and
cold temperatures, epidemics and earthquakes. The e↵ects of earthquakes have been
examined in terms of conflict propensity, but not in terms of lower-level social con-
flict, human rights or leadership tenure 3 Distinguishing between the types of natural
3Smith and Flores (forthcoming) examine the e↵ects of natural disasters and governance on the
number of people killed, and on the number of protests and demonstrations.
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disasters is important because governments’ policies vary by disaster types, threats
and vulnerabilities (Smith & Quiroz Flores, 2010).
Figure 2.1 shows the number of natural disasters by disaster type between 1950 and
2010, clearly showing an increase in the total number of disasters Em-dat (2010).
More disaster events means more expenditures for states in relief and compensation,
more a↵ected people, and more opportunities for citizens to evaluate their govern-
ment’s policy performance. The incidence of all natural disasters is on the rise in
all categories of disaster events; however, weather events account for the greatest
proportion of natural disasters as well as the category with the greatest increase in
events. The scientific and policy communities have paid more attention recently to
the increase in natural disasters which are projected to increase in frequency and
intensity as climate and weather patterns change. Concern for geological natural
disasters have not rallied the policy and scientific communities in this same fashion.
Because people hold governments accountable for natural disasters, it is important
to disentangle whether people are responding to the e↵ects of natural disasters or to
their political salience as leaders pay increasing attention to their consequences.
Figure 2.2 shows the number (in thousands) of people a↵ected by natural disasters.
The total number a↵ected by natural disasters is a function of several factors: first,
there are more people living now than at any other point in human history; second,
many millions of people are living in economically, politically and socially vulnerable
situations; and third, the number of natural disasters is increasing, as is the intensity
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Figure 2.1. All Natural Disasters 1960-2008 (Source: EmDat)
with which they occur. As more people are a↵ected by the humanitarian elements of
natural disasters, problems of hunger, access to clean water, physical displacement
and security become more important. Governments are accountable to an increasing
number of people who demand their e↵orts in providing relief and compensation from
natural disasters. More people a↵ected translates to more demand on government
resources.
While all natural disasters have humanitarian, social and political impacts, the natu-
ral disasters - that occur most frequently and a↵ect the most people have the largest
impact on political processes. More demand on government resources as costs and
casualties from natural disasters accumulate may mean that governments become
less willing and able to provide disaster prevention and response measures.
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Figure 2.2. Total number of people a↵ected by natural disasters in 100,000s, 1960-2008
(Source: EmDat)
Vulnerability and threats to specific populations
There are also within-country di↵erences in disaster preparation and responses, ev-
ident in the case of Hurricanes Katrina where local, state and federal agencies were
criticized for failing to prepare and intervene e↵ectively. States that are less willing
and able to address the consequences of natural disasters may also have other pre-
existing problems, like income inequality, poverty, a history of conflict, or aggrieved
minority populations which can threaten specific populations.
To address threats to both general and specific populations, states’ natural disas-
ter policies can include humanitarian programs of vaccinations to inoculate citizens
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against preventable diseases, and maintaining a su cient medical infrastructure.
They can also include public works like paved roads, levees and dams, emergency
warning systems, and maintaining professionalized militaries for responding to dis-
aster zones. Using the example of Hurricane Katrina, we can see that even while the
United States is both willing and able to prepare for and respond to natural disasters,
much of the population a↵ected by this event had pre-existing vulnerabilities which
made its e↵ects more calamitous. In spite of clear predictions about the storm’s
intensity and trajectory, many citizens in the path of Hurricane Katrina were unable
to evacuate. Those trapped in their homes and within the disaster zone faced many
months of chaos and disorder. Hurricane Katrina exposed inter-agency coordination
problems, and showed Thus the number of people killed and a↵ected by the various
types of natural disasters can indicate both the severity of the event, and the size of
the threatened population.
Depending on the type of government and the capacity to address existing vulnera-
bilities and those made more exigent by threats posed by natural disasters, people
can expect varying levels of preventive and palliative policies. People in poverty of-
ten require more services and intervention because they lack the resources to bu↵er
the costs of the natural disaster on their own. Poverty on an international level is a
relative concept; the baseline for poverty in Bangladesh is di↵erent from poverty in
Canada. However, across countries people in poverty do tend to spend more on food
and housing and face more threats than citizens with more resources. Poverty also
creates more vulnerability to natural disaster shocks that increase the prices of basic
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needs like food and housing. Natural disasters are likely to a↵ect people in poverty as
well as people working in the agricultural sector, which are often overlapping groups.
Natural disasters happen in every country, and the variation in their e↵ects is related
to the individual state’s willingness and ability to cope with the consequences. It
is also evident that a storm or earthquake will a↵ect Haiti di↵erently than it will
the United States because there are important economic, political and humanitarian
response di↵erences between those two countries. More people are a↵ected and killed
in countries with higher poverty rates, less investment in preventive infrastructure,
and fewer resources to respond. Natural disasters can have cascading e↵ects, mean-
ing that one disaster can precipitate another. Floods can spur insect infestations and
epidemics. Extreme temperatures can lead to droughts. Citizens, especially minority
groups and those in poverty, can be multiply vulnerable to several natural disasters
simultaneously.
E↵ects on agriculture
Having an economy dependent on agriculture makes a country particularly suscepti-
ble to the deleterious e↵ects of natural disasters, since many natural disasters a↵ect
countries’ production capacity. The sophistication and diversity of a country’s eco-
nomic portfolio is a function of state capacity, as agriculture is the bellwether for
gauging the impact of natural disasters. Countries reliant on subsistence agriculture,
on primary commodity exports, or on grain imports or subsidies are particularly vul-
nerable to negative consequences of natural disasters. This is in part due to a high
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correlation between countries with agricultural primary commodities and high rates
of poverty, which makes then especially vulnerable to natural disasters. Countries
with inadequate agricultural infrastructure, like machinery or storage facilities, are
also similarly vulnerable. Interestingly, these countries are not only vulnerable to
natural disasters that happen within their own borders, but also to natural disasters
which happen in the international system which a↵ect the production and supply of
agricultural products.
Natural disasters also have the potential to a↵ect the agricultural sector in multiple
ways. Droughts, floods, insect infestations, storms and extreme hot and cold temper-
atures all have the potential to destroy crops. When crops are destroyed, food prices
often increase, and rising prices are unequally felt across societies. This is especially
true for vulnerable societies, like those with high poverty rates and weak political
institutions. Natural disasters that a↵ect agriculture and crop production may a↵ect
political processes that extend beyond the border of the country in which they occur.
In other words, local natural disasters may have global e↵ects. The globalization of
food production and distribution has made disparate economies dependent on each
other. Global exports and imports of grain can make societies vulnerable to natural
disasters happening throughout the world. While local natural disasters are likely to
have the greatest e↵ect on political processes, we cannot discount the e↵ect of natu-
ral disasters that happen worldwide, especially those that interrupt the production
and distribution of basic food commodities.
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The narrative from the long-cycles literature demonstrates that cooling tempera-
ture curtailed agricultural production and depleted grain storages. Societies’ success
in adapting to the challenges of natural disasters lies in how they regulate their food
systems.The role of agriculture in the two long-trend studies cannot be understated:
agriculture is the conduit between climate and weather patterns and human behav-
ior. Many developing countries are still reliant on subsistence agriculture, however,
while the developed countries export their bumper crops to global markets. Zhang
et al. (2007b) describe the process as follows:
“When agricultural production went down, wheat prices went up in both
Europe and China. When prices reached a certain level, more wars
erupted. Population growth rates were influenced by both war frequency
and food supply per capita (reflected in cereal prices) and dramatically
dropped to negative values when agricultural production was at its lowest
levels, cereal prices reached their highest level, and peaks in war frequency
occurred.”
Access to food and water, determined by seasonal planting and harvesting cycles, is
paramount to human survival. These cycles are sensitive to variations in temper-
atures, rainfall, and soil quality. While structures like homes and public buildings
can be rebuilt relatively quickly, destroying a season of crops can years-long e↵ects
that can be felt throughout the country and throughout the world, not just in the
location experiencing the disaster.As in the past, the interruption of agricultural
production, whether due to mismanagement of natural resources or by changes in
the weather and climate, a↵ects people and societies. In pre-modern society, when
agricultural resources were depleted, societies either became extinct or people moved
on to greener pastures. While not everyone in society is a producer of agricultural
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products, everyone is a consumer. Inasmuch as natural disasters disrupt the supply
of basic necessities, they create a context for political grievances and assessing gov-
ernment performance.
In 1977, Canada su↵ered a drought that cost the country upwards of $100 mil-
lion in extra power generation costs, $20 million in unanticipated fire mitigation
e↵orts, and $10 million in emergency federal and provincial drought relief programs.
In 2001, it experienced another drought costing $4 billion dollars. However, nei-
ther of these events were “characterized by catastrophic injury or death (Khandekar,
2004).” Canada was able and willing to undertake these e↵orts because of existing
measures similar to the federal crop insurance programs enacted as a part of the New
Deal in the United States after the 1930s Dust Bowl. Natural disasters that occur
in the world’s breadbasket countries may not result in a tremendous loss of life in
those countries in which they occur, but they can have international ramifications
for countries that rely on their crop production as food imports.
Today famines and undernourishment plague many societies. People still migrate
and immigrate, both willingly and forcibly, in search of food security as well. Some
of these coping mechanisms have survived, while others have evolved with the devel-
opment of modern forms of government and social institutions. People make demands
of their government to help o↵set the burden of adaptation to food availability and
cost. While governments are not held accountable for the natural disasters them-
selves, they are, however, viewed as arbiters of the economic climate. When food
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prices increase, governments can o↵er price supports for basic food goods, and con-
trol the amount of food imported and exported to accommodate the needs of citizens
and prevent or quell unrest. They can invest in public infrastructure like roads to
transport goods, and irrigation that makes land more fertile and productive. Gov-
ernments can protect private property to help both farmers and consumers cope with
natural disasters.
African exceptionalism
A prominent specialization within recent scholarship on climate change and social
problems is the examination of how these processes are a↵ecting Sub-Saharan Africa,
and their likelihood on the incidence of civil wars. Many scholars have been singu-
larly focused on the deleterious consequences of climate change in the Sahel, like the
e↵ects on African crops (Burke et al., 2009b; Mller et al., 2011), and the risk of civil
war (Burke et al., 2009a; Raleigh, 2010; Buhaug, 2010; Hendrix & Salehyan, 2010).
In spite of overwhelming evidence that natural disasters are a global, not regional
problem, much scholarship still continues to focus on Africa. As previously men-
tioned, the government, climate and conflict in the Sudan has led some scholars to
call the confluence of problems the world’s first modern climate war. In some ways,
the conflict in Darfur exemplifies the standard story of the relationship between cli-
mate and conflict, whereby resource competition as a function of degradation and
scarcity creates or exacerbates grievances between groups in society, thereby inciting
violent conflict. The violent conflict, in turn, damages the environment as a casualty
of war as well as poor institutional governance and management. As an African
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nation, it is emblematic of the focus of most recent scholarship on the relationship
between environment and conflict on the African continent.
In some sense, Darfur has served as the archetypical scenario for the social, political
and humanitarian problems associated with climate change and natural disasters.
This scenario of privilege and power, drought and famine, ethnic tension, and civil
war has led researchers to conceive of all climate problems in this fashion. Darfur has
been the model for analyzing the e↵ects of natural disasters on society. This analysis
has yielded wildly divergent findings that encourage some scholars to claim a strong
significant e↵ect of climate on conflict, and others to find a weak or inconclusive
relationship. Many intractable problems are found in Africa, from poor governance
to ethnic conflict to civil war to economic stagnation to disease and famine. The
world pays great attention to the problems facing Africa, and provides substantial
funding and humanitarian aid to countries located on that continent.
There are several reasons why focusing on Africa may not help us understand the full
range of e↵ects that all countries throughout the world may experience. First, social
problems like civil wars, domestic conflicts are overrepresented on the African con-
tinent. Second, African states are remarkably homogenous in terms of post-colonial
leadership styles and non-democratic regime types. Finally, the region is prone to
exceptionally fragile environmental conditions because of the terrain and climate, as
well as widespread underdevelopment and poverty, and many countries are reliant on
foreign aid and assistance. The commonality of Africa’s problems of inadequate in-
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frastructure and undiversified economies beyond agricultural subsistence, oil wealth
and the diamond industry, limit scope of our inferences since these conditions are not
representative of governments around the globe. For these reasons, we must take a
global perspective on natural disasters to be able to make generalizable claims about
their consequences.
In the subsequent sections I discuss the ways in which natural disasters, conditioned
on states’ willingness and ability to cope with them, a↵ect various political processes
including social conflict, leadership duration and human rights.
2.6 Dependent variables
Social conflict
Natural disasters can exacerbate existing and create new grievances in society. The
degree of income inequality and dispersion of wealth, political e cacy and power, and
protection of minority rights and representation may a↵ect the propensity for con-
flict or contentious behavior. Natural disasters, as previously mentioned, are threat
multipliers in that they create a tipping point for social and political behavior. When
natural disasters happen, they highlight political and institutional weaknesses and
provide the opportunity for aggrieved citizens to articulate their grievances. One way
citizens can demonstrate their frustration with government response, or lack thereof,
is through protests or other forms of publicly contentious behavior.
Natural disasters can exacerbate pre-existing problems and provoke previously estab-
lished grievances. In this sense, they serve as threat multipliers for already vulnerable
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populations, like those in poverty as well as political, ethnic and/or religious minori-
ties. While cross-nationally poverty is a relative concept, the notion that people
living in poverty are more vulnerable to natural disasters is not. Natural disasters
exacerbate existing and create new grievances. They create unequal consequences
in society, identify political and institutional weaknesses, provide opportunities for
articulating grievances as well as incentives to reward or punish leaders for their dis-
aster responses, and they provide opportunities for exhibiting contentious behavior.
Most existing literature focuses heavily on civil war as an outcome following nat-
ural disasters, particularly those related to climate, weather and earthquakes. Re-
searchers and policymakers have expressed tremendous interest in understanding
the determinants of civil wars, since they tend to be economically, politically and
socially very costly. However, civil wars are still relatively rare events, and investi-
gating lower-level contentious behavior will help to fill in a gap in existing conflict
processes theory. To look at the e↵ects of natural disasters solely through the expe-
rience of civil war is to limit our potential findings, since many interesting political
phenomena related to natural disasters may not meet the threshold definition of civil
wars.
A more likely scenario than civil war is lower-level social disturbances like demonstra-
tions, protests and riots happen more frequently. Sub-national contentious behavior
is a more likely outcome than civil wars, and is yet an under-explored area of research.
People and governments in both poor and wealthy countries are often unprepared
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for the range of events, including protests, that follow natural disasters. Discontent
is a likely outcome when people are displaced, when security is tenuous, when do-
mestic institutions insu ciently absorb the weather shocks, and when people deem
the government response unsatisfactory.
Both civil wars and contentious behavior require actors to overcome collective action
problems. Participation in public demonstrations, protests or riots requires coordi-
nation between participants, but this coordination is fundamentally di↵erent from
that required to mount and sustain a civil war which requires access to weapons and
a long-term strategy for fighting. The ultimate goals di↵er between civil wars and
more general contentious behavior, where the former may seek a complete overturn
of the current government and the latter may seek redress of specific grievances or
attention to particular disaster-related policies. While civil wars seek a change of
government, protests, demonstrations and riots are more likely seeking a change of
policies within the existing government.
Given the di↵erences between the goals of combatants in a civil war and those of
people participating in protests and demonstrations, scholars make a giant theoret-
ical leap in stating that natural disasters provoke civil wars. All states experience
natural disasters, but few states experience civil wars. This presents a curious prob-
lem: why do all states not experience civil wars following natural disasters? One
explanation is that researchers are looking at the wrong phenomenon, since many
states do experience disruptive protests, demonstrations and riots. It is possible to
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disaggregate the question further by asking if all natural disasters lead to contentious
behavior, or if some are more aggravating than others? Conservatively, we can say
that we have much to learn about the social and political e↵ects of natural disasters
given their many forms and outcomes.
It is logical to question under what circumstances people would participate in protests,
demonstrations or riots as a result of natural disasters. In some states, protest may
be ritualized and protected as part of fundamental freedoms, i.e. expression and as-
sembly. Protest may be used gain media attention, to forge alliances within society
and demonstrate solidarity with a↵ected citizens, to elucidate grievances against the
current party in power, to engage government leaders in dialogue, and to mobilize and
energize voters during elections. Conversely, other forms of protest, like riots, may
happen when government institutions are unresponsive not only in providing disaster
assistance, but for holding leaders and o cials accountable for their shortcomings.
Thus protest can be both ritualized or destabilizing, depending on the institutional
context, the group a↵ected, and the number of people a↵ected by the natural disaster.
It is important to understand the function of contentious behavior following nat-
ural disasters as distinct from civil wars because in most cases, the grievances do not
lead to civil wars and are resolved by other means. For example, governments can
accede to the protesters’ demands, and the protesters can find relief through electoral
and judiciary institutions. Conversely, governments can ignore the protests, or they
can use repressive measures to quash them. Individual case studies have identified
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the role of changing weather and climate on protest behavior, as in the phenomena
of food riots where the cost of food drives mass public demonstrations. However, as
a global phenomena, sub-national contentious behavior related to natural disasters
is not well understood.
Food, shelter and physical security
Natural disasters create complex humanitarian emergencies. Because people are of-
ten displaced from their homes and dispossessed of their belongings, governments
are called upon to help citizens reconstruct their lives from scratch. Citizens can
find themselves deprived of basic human rights, like access to food, clean water, and
shelter, following natural disasters. Some countries possess su cient resources to
assist citizens in the aftermath of natural disasters, but others lack the necessary
infrastructure and supplies to alleviate su↵ering and help restore order in society.
Other states have the ability but lack the will to intervene on behalf of their citizens.
Without proper infrastructure, initial natural disasters like floods can give rise to
subsequent natural disasters, like infectious diseases or insect infestations. In Haiti,
for example, following the 2010 earthquake the country experience an outbreak of
cholera because of insu cient sanitation and basic infrastructure to prevent or halt
the spread of the disease. Hurricane storms also exacerbate the sanitation problems
facing Haitian society as they, too, destroy structures, create standing pools of water
that breed mosquitoes, and contaminate clean water sources with e✏uent.
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Many natural disasters also displace people, which exacerbates the issue of food
and water security. Internally displaced persons often lack access to adequate food
and clean water, as well as permanent shelter. People also cross borders to escape
the aftermath of natural disasters and in search of better provision of basic necessi-
ties. Natural disasters create refugees with a tenuous pipeline for basic sustenance.
When people are displaced, they are likely to need tremendous assistance from either
the state or private groups. They are more likely to consume state resources than
contribute to state wealth.
In spite of the well-recognized humanitarian implications of natural disasters, we
know relatively little about how they systematically a↵ect access to basic necessities
like food, water and housing. Food and water are essential to sustaining life, and
these valuable resources can be in short supply following natural disasters. Humans
cannot survive without adequate caloric intake and potable water. Natural disasters
can deplete and contaminate water supplies, decrease agricultural production, and
make food security a paramount issue.
They also create refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs) who require higher
levels of support over sustained lengths of time. Refugees are transnationally dis-
placed, while IDPs are displaced within the borders of their own country. Both
present complex problems for all types of states, including those who are both will-
ing and able, neither willing nor able, and alternately willing and able.
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Beyond basic human rights, natural disasters can also provide opportunities for gov-
ernments to active violate citizens’ rights through repression and violations of their
physical integrity. Whether or not citizens’ human rights are actively violated is
dependent on state capacity and government type. Davenport (1999) established
that democracies are less likely to use repression than are non-democracies, and
that democratization also decreases the rate of repression within states. Democra-
cies are better than autocracies at protecting human rights than are autocracies for
many reasons, including regular, free and fair elections, a strong rule of law, redress
of grievances through formal legal channels, and a broad base of citizen support
and participation for these institutions (Fein, 1995; Davenport, 1999; Cingranelli &
Richards, 1999; Davenport et al., 2004; Richards & Gelleny, 2007). States may oppor-
tunistically resort to repression following natural disasters, especially if those a↵ected
are seeking relief by engaging in contentious behavior like protests or demonstrations.
Fates of leaders
All natural disasters are a problem for governments because citizens expect that
governments will provide relief, compensation and redress for their e↵ects. Natural
disasters are fundamentally unique from other economic or political shocks: eco-
nomic and political policies reflect specific, deliberate government policies for which
citizens rightfully and logically can hold their leaders accountable. For example, if
leaders initiate an unpopular war, they may su↵er the consequences politically, espe-
cially if the war e↵ort is unsuccessful. If leaders enact economic policies that foster
inflation and unemployment, they may also be held similarly accountable for these
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actions. While governments do not create natural disasters, their policies determine
how disasters a↵ect their citizens.
Natural disasters may a↵ect the duration of tenure in o ce, and the means by which
power is removed. People both reward and punish leaders for policy performance,
and leaders who perform poorly are likely to be removed from o ce while those who
satisfy the public’s needs should be rewarded with longer tenure within the political
and institutional bounds of that particular society. People hold leaders accountable
for their policy actions. They reward favorable policies with longer tenure and pun-
ish leaders for unpopular policies by removing them from o ce. The mechanisms for
removing leaders from o ce di↵er by government type. Autocratic leaders generally
hold power much longer than leaders of democracies whose terms are limited by in-
stitutional constraints.
An essential element of adequate natural disaster policy is responding in a timely
matter. Ideally, governments will respond quickly to the problems created by natural
disasters. The type of natural disaster may help to characterize the speed of govern-
ment response. Disasters that happen quickly are likely to create clear expectations
of need, including the type of assistance that governments should provide. Other dis-
asters that have a slower onset, like droughts, may encourage governments to delay
their responses. From the government’s perspective, this is a rational decision, given
that in normal years, there is an expected amount of rainfall and that the current
conditions are an anomaly. Rather than invest scarce resources in a disaster that
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they believe will likely resolve itself in the next season or next year, governments will
be more likely to withhold resources pending a natural resolution to the problem.
2.7 Expectations
Given states’ varying willingness and abilities to respond to natural disasters, we
can expect di↵erent outcomes across societies. Democracies should be more willing
to respond to natural disasters based on the size of the constituency to whom they
are accountable, and given the regularity of elections whereby they may be removed
from o ce if their constituents blame them for ine↵ective or ine cient responses.
Other literature has shown that in democratic states like the United States and Ger-
many, citizens reward their leaders for favorable post-disaster policy performance
and punish them for poor performance (Healy & Malhotra, 2009; Achen et al., 2004;
Bechtel & Hainmueller, 2011). Even though leaders in democracies are not rewarded
for disaster prevention to the same degree as they are for disaster response, democra-
cies should be better than autocracies at providing public goods like roads, security,
health care and human services that mitigate the deleterious e↵ects of natural dis-
asters.
Autocracies, on the other hand, should be less willing to prepare for or respond
to natural disasters because their tenure in o ce is dependent on a comparatively
small constituency. Because they remain in o ce by providing private goods to a
small group of supporters, leaders of autocracies have a disincentive to prepare for
or respond to their citizens’ needs following natural disasters because they do not
require their support for extended time in o ce.
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In addition to willingness, states responses to natural disasters are also conditioned
on their capacity to respond. States’ ability is distinct from willingness in that states
with su cient economic power, or a budget su ciently allocated for disaster preven-
tion and mitigation, may not require political will to address the problems created
by natural disasters, as seen in the case of China or primary resource-rich coun-
tries like the United Arab Emirates. However, just because a state is theoretically
able to respond, does not mean that they will. Political will is theoretically more
important than a state’s ability to respond, as demonstrated in the case of Singapore.
Varying levels of willingness and ability create di↵erent vulnerabilities for states.
First, leaders can be vulnerable to removal from o ce. Leaders of states that are
both willing and able should theoretically be rewarded with extended tenure in of-
fice, and leaders of states that are neither willing nor able should theoretically be
removed from o ce. Leaders of states with more natural disasters and more people
killed and a↵ected by them are more vulnerable than leaders with fewer disasters
and fewer citizens a↵ected.
Second, countries can be vulnerable to social unrest if citizens’ needs are unmet
following natural disasters. Natural disasters have created opportunities for events
like food riots that can be either formulaic and procedural protest events, or they
can be destabilizing and threatening to the establishment (Tilly, 1983). Countries
experiencing more natural disasters and which have more people a↵ected by natural
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disasters should be more likely to experience heightened levels of protest behav-
ior. Since public assembly and protest are often constitutionally protected events in
democracies, we should expect to see some contentious behavior, but substantially
less than in non-democratic countries which often lack supplemental institutionalized
elections and legitimate means of evaluation.
Finally, people living in countries that are neither willing nor able to address problems
created by natural disasters should be theoretically most vulnerable to violations of
their basic human rights to food and shelter, and also to violations of higher-order
civil rights like freedom from oppression. However, even countries which are both
willing and able are not immune to human rights violations as the frequency of dis-
asters and the number a↵ected by them increase.
As the number of natural disasters and those a↵ected by them increase, states’
ability and willingness to prepare for and respond to them decreases. States face
shortages of resources to mitigate disasters the more frequently they occur. Natural
disasters that happen within the international system can have negative consequences
on individual countries; in other words the disaster need not happen in within the
country’s own borders for its e↵ects to be felt. The globalization of disaster e↵ects
has kept pace with the globalization of commodities trading and increase mutual
interdependence between nations.
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2.8 Conclusion
This chapter describes a theory of how natural disasters a↵ect political processes
given states’ varying willingness and abilities. Natural disasters disrupt the sta-
tus quo and create humanitarian emergencies. People look to their government to
respond when this happens, and they evaluate their government’s responses. Gov-
ernments’ responses vary according to their willingness and ability to prepare for
and respond to natural disasters. Willingness is determined by government type,
and ability is determined by state capacity.
Governments do not cause natural disasters, but they are held accountable for their
e↵ects and the degree of public support in their aftermath. They do not determine
whether or when the rain falls, nor in what quantity. Governments do not make rivers
surpass their normal levels, or direct the paths of hurricanes, storms or tornadoes.
However, governments are held accountable by their citizens for the policy decisions
they make in preparation for and in the aftermath of natural disasters. Governments
prioritize policies and allocate funding for the public infrastructure necessary to cope
with unpredictable natural disaster events (Cohen & Werker, 2008).
While all states could experience a drought, for example, only those without ad-
equate irrigation, drought-resistant seeds, or adequate food reserves in storage will
be likely to feel negative consequences from the lack of rain. Governments do not
control natural disasters, but they can provide adequate safety nets to feed their hun-
gry people, stabilize prices, and mitigate the amount of damage to homes, businesses
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and agriculture. In essence, it is not so much whether natural disasters happen, but
where they happen.
Natural disasters make states vulnerable in several ways: at the level of the state, the
leader, and the citizens. They can influence contentious behavior and social conflict,
and a↵ect the basic human rights and physical integrity of citizens. Leaders, as the
key policymakers for states, are punished or rewarded for disaster responses. Natural
disasters are not all of one type; rather, some a↵ect more people and happen more
frequently and as such, are more problematic for states.
Contentious behavior in states with weak capacity can have vastly di↵erent con-
sequences than in states with strong capacity, especially in a state lacking formal
legal and electoral means for redress of grievances. Natural disasters have vastly
di↵erent implications for states with weak rules for regular transfer of leadership
and power. Natural disasters are threat amplifiers for states with weak capacity to
respond to exogenous economic or political shocks.
Civil war scholars have led the charge in studying the political consequences of nat-
ural disasters, honing in on Africa as the epicenter of problems. Yet there is reason
to believe that there are other equally important global phenomena in addition to
civil war to understand. This includes understanding how natural disasters impact
the duration of leaders in o ce, the e↵ects on human rights, and the presence of
lower-level social conflict and contentious behavior. Given the increase in the num-
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ber of natural disasters as well as those a↵ected, natural disaster-related political
consequences are important to investigate, as they create and exacerbate grievances
and vulnerabilities.
In the subsequent chapters, I empirically evaluate the e↵ects of natural disasters
on the tenure of leaders in o ce, on human rights practices, and on contentious
behavior.
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Chapter 3
LEADERSHIP TENURE
3.1 Leadership tenure and natural disasters
As we learned in Chapter 2, governments are varyingly willing and able to prepare
for and respond to natural disasters. This chapter empirically evaluates this rela-
tionship between government willingness and ability and the tenure of leaders in
o ce by asking the question, do natural disasters a↵ect how long leaders remain in
o ce? In country-specific literature, other scholars have demonstrated that leaders
are rewarded for favorable policy responses and punished for inadequate responses
(Achen et al., 2004; Bechtel & Hainmueller, 2011; Healy & Malhotra, 2009; Zhang
et al., 2007a,b).
However, the fates of leaders and regimes when natural disasters happen is under-
developed in the literature. 1 We can draw on the existing literature examining
the e↵ects of economic shocks and crises, which may have natural disasters as their
point of origin. It is well-known that citizens punish and reward their leaders for
the country’s economic performance, but what portion of their votes is attributable
1Smith and Flores (forthcoming) examine the e↵ects of natural disasters and governance on the
number of people killed, and on the number of protests and demonstrations.
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to natural disasters? By identifying e↵ects of natural disasters, we may be able to
learn more about what makes leaders and governments both vulnerable and stable.
While governments do not cause natural disasters, they are held accountable for
their e↵ects and the degree of public support in their aftermath. They do not de-
termine whether or when the rain falls, nor in what quantity. Governments do not
make rivers surpass their normal levels, or direct the paths of hurricanes, storms or
tornadoes. However, governments are held accountable by their citizens for the pol-
icy decisions they make in preparation for and in the aftermath of natural disasters.
Leaders choose to prioritize policies and allocate funding for the public infrastructure
necessary to cope with unpredictable natural disaster events. Governments do not
control natural disasters, but they can provide adequate safety nets to feed their
hungry people, stabilize prices, and mitigate the amount of damage to homes, busi-
nesses and agriculture. Natural disasters happen everywhere, but the extent of their
damage is conditioned on the type of society in which they occur.
All natural disasters are a problem for governments because citizens expect that
governments will provide relief, compensation and redress for their e↵ects. Natural
disasters are fundamentally unique from other economic or political shocks: eco-
nomic and political policies reflect specific, deliberate government policies for which
citizens rightfully and logically can hold their leaders accountable. For example, if
leaders initiate an unpopular war, they may su↵er the consequences politically, espe-
cially if the war e↵ort is unsuccessful. If leaders enact economic policies that foster
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inflation and unemployment, they may also be held similarly accountable for these
actions. While governments do not create natural disasters, their policies determine
how disasters a↵ect their citizens.
Hypothesis 1: Increases in natural disasters reduce the time of leaders in o ce.
Natural disasters a↵ect the duration of leaders’ tenure in o ce. Political institutions,
dependent on government type, condition the ways in which leaders are removed from
o ce. People both reward and punish leaders for policy performance, and leaders
who perform poorly are likely to be removed from o ce while those who satisfy the
public’s needs should be rewarded with longer tenure within the political and insti-
tutional bounds of that particular society. People hold leaders accountable for their
policy actions. They reward favorable policies with longer tenure and punish leaders
for unpopular policies by removing them from o ce. The mechanisms for removing
leaders from o ce di↵er by government type. For democracies, regular removal from
o ce often transpires through predetermined elections held at predictable intervals.
For autocracies, regular removal entails designation of a successor or according to
hereditary lineage. Irregular means of removal include acts which contravene es-
tablished procedures “explicit rules and established conventions,” including coups,
revolutions and assassinations (Goemans et al., 2009). Autocratic leaders generally
hold power much longer than leaders of democracies whose terms are limited by more
rigorous institutional constraints.
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Hypothesis 2: Increases in natural disasters increase time in o ce for leaders of
countries that are most willing and able.
It is possible that governments pursue di↵erent strategies for di↵erent types of natu-
ral disasters. Given that not all disasters are alike, governments are likely to pursue
rational policies which depend in part on their factor endowments, geography, sys-
tem of governance and future expectations. Natural disasters that happen quickly
require a timely response, whereas natural disasters that evolve slowly over time may
provide governments the ability to delay their response.
The a↵ected sector of society and populations also may help determine the quickness
and thoroughness of government response. Natural disasters that a↵ect a portion
of the population that the leadership relies upon for support and tenure can likely
expect a more swift and thorough response than those groups not essential for main-
taining leadership tenure.
Governments can respond to natural disasters in several ways: through incident-
appropriate policy choices; through a delayed response; with no response at all; by
blaming the incumbent leader or opposition political group; and by blaming the pub-
lic. Under ideal circumstances, when natural disasters happen, governments would
show appropriate stewardship of public resources and allocate funding to assist the
victims. This could mean compensation for economic losses, assistance with transi-
tional housing or relocation, provision of humanitarian goods like food, water and
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medical assistance, provision of police or military personnel to maintain and establish
security and order and assist with evacuation, if necessary. Good governance related
to natural disasters could also mean that governments provide adequate preparation
and mitigation against eventual problems, like building levees and dykes, maintain-
ing public infrastructure like roads and bridges, and helping to coordinate emergency
disaster response plans.
Ideally, governments will respond quickly to the problems created by natural dis-
asters. The type of natural disaster may help to characterize the speed of govern-
ment response. Disasters that happen quickly are likely to create clear expectations
of need, including the type of assistance that governments should provide. Other
disasters that have a slower onset, like droughts, may encourage governments to de-
lay their responses. From the government’s perspective, this is a rational decision,
given that in normal years, there is an expected amount of rainfall and that the
current conditions are an anomaly. Rather than invest scarce resources in a disaster
that they believe will likely resolve itself in the next season or next year, governments
will be more likely to withhold resources pending a natural resolution to the problem.
Governments also may delay preventative measures to thwart future problems related
to natural disasters because the expected gain on returns in public infrastructure are
not strong enough (Achen et al., 2004). With regard to disaster preparation, an ounce
of prevention is not always worth a pound of cure. Initial research on disaster pre-
paredness indicates that while preventive measures are cost-e↵ective, they are ranked
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low amongst constituent priorities. On the other hand, post-hoc expenditures are re-
garded as very important and help citizens evaluate their leaders policy performance.
Governments may choose not to respond at all to natural disasters for the same
expected utility reasons. If the disaster happens to a constituent group not essential
to their tenure in o ce or in power, they may lack an incentive to respond at all. If
natural disasters help to displace, marginalize or disempower an opposition group,
the government in power could justify a null response. A government may also choose
not to respond because they do not have the requisite resources to address the range
of problems.
Leaders may blame their predecessor for failure to adequately prepare for or respond
to natural disasters. Opposition parties or factions may blame majority parties for
the same reason, as well as to capitalize on political opportunities that natural dis-
asters present. These opportunities include articulating grievances and mobilizing
their constituency. Most interestingly, governments also blame their own people for
the aftermath of natural disasters.
Hypothesis 3: Increases in natural disasters decrease time in o ce for leaders that
are neither willing nor able.
Hypothesis 4: Increases in natural disasters decrease time in o ce for leaders that
are alternately willing and able.
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There are many variables that influence leaders’ calculations about their prospects
for remaining in power, the number of people a↵ected by the natural disaster, and
the type of the natural disaster. There is reason to believe that not all disasters have
the same e↵ects on populations and leadership tenure. The intensity, severity, dura-
tion and scope of the disasters a↵ect the calculations that leaders and governments
make. For this project I focus on the disasters which occur most frequently and a↵ect
the greatest numbers of people. These include extreme hot and cold temperatures,
droughts, floods, storms, epidemics, and earthquakes.
Previous research on the e↵ect of natural disasters on conflict behavior has asked
whether natural disasters happen disproportionately to lower-income countries (Davis
& Seitz, 1982). As a starting point, this is a logical question, since much of the focus
is on the devastation they create. I argue that natural disasters happen to every
country, and that the variation in their e↵ects has to do moreso with the country’s
coping mechanisms than an event count of disasters.
It is evident that a storm will a↵ect Haiti di↵erently than it will the United States
because there are important economic, political and humanitarian response di↵er-
ences between those two countries. Figure 3.1 shows the number of people killed and
a↵ected by floods, droughts, storms, extreme temperatures, epidemics and earth-
quakes between 1960 and 2008, the period which I examine in this paper.
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Figure 3.1. Number killed and a↵ected by floods, droughts, storms, extreme hot and
cold temperatures, epidemics and earthquakes in 100,000s (Source: Em-Dat, 1960-
2008)
Natural disasters can be located in a local and a global context. They can happen
within and a↵ect a single state, and can also happen within a single state and a↵ect
other states throughout the international system of states. For example, imagine
the following scenarios: 1. A country which only experiences a flood, but is able to
su ciently source its population’s basic dietary needs because the food system was
not interrupted by the flood; 2. A country which experiences no endemic natural
disasters, but who is dependent on imports of crops that were a↵ected by natural
disasters in other states; 3. A country which is a↵ected both by local and global
shocks, experiencing natural disasters within its boundaries and simultaneously af-
fected by the aggregate natural disasters at the global level. Distinguishing between
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global and local shocks is substantively important since the presence of either or
both can have political, economic and humanitarian consequences.
Hypothesis 5: Increases in global natural disasters decrease time in o ce for leaders.
Natural disasters are not only temporally relevant, but spatially as well. Droughts,
floods, wildfires, extreme temperatures and insect infestations can destroy crops that
a↵ect the food supply and prices not only of the country in which they occur, but
worldwide. Globalization has increased trading ties between agricultural producers
in di↵erent states, so when natural disasters happen in countries responsible for pro-
duction of necessary foodstu↵s, other countries are a↵ected as well. This means that
local vulnerabilities can have regional or international repercussions for food prices
and food security, which itself can provoke a range of potential political consequences.
These political consequences are the e↵ects related especially to the availability and
price of food, including protests and demonstrations, forcible removal of leaders from
o ce through coups or revolutions, regime change through elections, and forms of
contentious behavior like protests or demonstrations. Recent research on the e↵ects
of global temperature increases on agricultural production found that between 1980
and 2008, “(g)lobal maize and wheat production declined by 3.8 and 5.5%, respec-
tively (Lobell et al., 2008).” These decreases in crop production “(t)translate into
average commodity price increases of 18.9 and 6.4% increases.” Governments have a
di cult time planning and preparing for natural disasters and managing their conse-
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quences within their own borders; the globalization of food production makes states
susceptible to the natural disasters occurring in the international system.
3.2 Data and Methods
The dependent variable for my analysis is the length of time in years that leaders
remain in o ce. Each episode of leadership tenure is recorded with a beginning and
ending year, with the final year coded as ‘1’. I record failure as the year that a leader
leaves o ce. In some years, multiple leaders held o ce. In this case, I coded that
year as belonging to the leader that spent the most time in o ce during the year.
In other words, if a leader left o ce in March 1950, then that year was coded as
belonging to his successor.
For example, Grant (U.S.) left o ce on March 4, 1877 and was replaced by Hayes
who held o ce for four years. The year 1877 is coded as belonging to Hayes. The
year 1876 is tagged as the exit year for Grant and 1877 is tagged as the entry year
for Hayes. Similarly, Garfield entered o ce on March 4, 1881 and exited o ce on
September 19, 1881. Arthur entered o ce on September 19, 1881 and held o ce
for four years. During 1881, Garfield held o ce for the longest, so 1881 is coded as
belonging to Garfield. The year 1882 is coded as the entry year for Arthur.
If the same leader held o ce multiple consecutive times, I recorded that as one
episode. If the leader enters, leaves and then re-enters o ce, I code those as separate
episodes. The mean length of tenure for the most stable autocracies is 10 years,
whereas the mean length of tenure for the most stable autocracies is 4 years.
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Natural disaster data comes from The International Database (EM-DAT) at the
Centre for the Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED). CRED follows
specific rules for coding missing or unavailable data where zero does not represent
a value but rather means that no information is available. Information about dis-
aster events, including the numbers killed and a↵ected, comes from United Nations
agencies, governments, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent
Societies, and other various agencies (Em-dat, 2010). The numbers of killed and
a↵ected are measured in 100,000s.
I followed the missing data coding scheme instituted by CRED. However, in some
cases, EM-DAT data records the incidence of a natural disaster in a given year,
but not information about the number a↵ected. In this case, I extend their coding
scheme to code the number a↵ected as ”0” while retaining the information that in-
deed a disaster did occur.
To test the e↵ect of natural disasters on leadership tenure, I used the Cox propor-
tional hazards model. My unit of analysis is country-year and I use robust standard
errors clustered by country. I test a basic model of natural disasters where the pri-
mary explanatory variable includes the total number of people a↵ected by extreme
hot and cold temperatures, droughts, storms and floods, standardized by population
size.
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I generated two dummy variables to capture both the e↵ect of government type
and state capacity. Government type is a dichotomous variable generated using the
Polity IV dataset. States are coded as ‘1’ if their Polity score is between 6 and 10 in
a given year, and 0 otherwise. For state capacity I use the measure of relative polit-
ical allocation generated by Arbetman-Rabinowitz & Johnson (2007) to generate a
dichotomous variable which assigns each country a ‘1’ if their relative political allo-
cation score is greater than the global mean for that year, and a score of ‘0’ if their
score falls below the mean. 2 I generate a three-point scale for each country-year. A
country which is neither willing nor able receives a score of ‘’0; a country which is
either willing or able receives a score of ‘1’; and a country which is both wiling and
able receives a score of ‘2’. The ‘0’ category is the default category in the statistical
estimation.
Table 3.1. Sample observations for Willingness and Ability
Willing Able
0 1
0 1,645 2,358
(26%) (38%)
1 1,050 1,233
(17%) (19%)
Table 3.1 shows the descriptive statistics for Willingness and Ability for states in the
sample. Table 3.2 shows the descriptive statistics for the natural disaster variables
included in the model.
2Kugler et al include in their measure of relative political allocation information about states’
general public spending, defense, public ordering, economic a↵airs, housing, health, education and
social protection. Their political allocation scale is bound between 0 and 2.
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Table 3.2. Summary statistics for independent variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Extreme heat and cold 0.117 8.708 7851
Drought 2.491 58.205 7851
Flood 3.844 59.238 7851
Storm 0.983 16.721 7851
Epidemic 0.029 0.815 7851
Earthquake 0.202 6.05 7851
Willing 0.363 0.481 6286
Able 0.601 0.49 7851
Willing +Able 0.934 0.674 6286
Global count of natural disasters 170.209 127.427 7851
Log of population 15.496 1.936 7513
3.3 Statistical estimation
The scale measuring states’ willingness and ability are interacted with the natural
disaster variables. I also include the log of population size by country as well as a
count of global natural disasters, including floods, droughts, storms, extreme temper-
atures, epidemics, and earthquakes. As is customary, I also include both Wilingness
and Ability as constituent terms (Brambor et al., 2006). I also test the proportional
hazards assumption and find no violations (Box-Ste↵ensmeier et al., 2003).
The sample includes 6,654 observations and 1,184 failures in failure-per-subject data.
Table 1 shows the results from the Cox proportional hazards model. Since natural
disasters do not occur in isolation from one another, I have included them all in one
model.
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Table 3.3. Cox duration model for leadership tenure and natural disasters
Variable Coe cient (Std. Err.)
Extreme heat and cold -42.509 (105.948)
Drought -0.026⇤ (0.012)
Flood -0.001† (0.001)
Storm 0.020⇤⇤ (0.007)
Epidemic -5.051† (2.826)
Earthquake -0.029 (0.078)
Willing and Able 0.188⇤⇤ (0.062)
Log of population 0.063⇤ (0.026)
Global count of events 0.001⇤⇤ (0.000)
1 (Willing + Able) ⇥ (Extreme heat and cold) 42.729 (105.947)
2 (Willing + Able) ⇥ (Extreme heat and cold) 42.524 (105.949)
1 (Willing + Able) ⇥ (Drought) 0.002 (0.028)
2 (Willing + Able) ⇥ (Drought) 0.026⇤ (0.012)
1 (Willing + Able) ⇥ (Flood) 0.002⇤ (0.001)
2 (Willing + Able) ⇥ (Flood) 0.004⇤⇤ (0.001)
1 (Willing + Able) ⇥ (Storm) -0.016⇤ (0.007)
2 (Willing + Able) ⇥ (Storm) -0.054⇤⇤ (0.018)
1 (Willing + Able) ⇥ (Epidemic) 4.462 (2.918)
2 (Willing + Able) ⇥ (Epidemic) 5.126† (2.827)
1 (Willing + Able) ⇥ (Earthquake) -0.005 (0.081)
2 (Willing + Able) ⇥ (Earthquake) 0.033 (0.078)
N 5305
Log-likelihood -5987.829
 2(21) 599.477
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Table 3.3 shows that for countries that are neither willing nor able, droughts, floods
and epidemics increase the tenure of leaders in countries that are neither willing
nor able able. Storms and global natural disasters decrease the tenure of leaders in
countries that are neither willing and able, and on those that are alternately willing
or able. The variable measuring the global count of events also shows a statistically
significant negative e↵ect on the survival of leaders in o ce.
For states that are alternately willing and able, floods decrease the leader’s time
in o ce, while storms increase leader’s tenure. For states that are both willing and
able, droughts and floods decrease leaders’ time in o ce, while storms increase their
time in o ce.
Figure 3.2 shows that the marginal e↵ects of these natural disasters given states’
varying willingness and ability are statistically significant, but small. These graphs
show the marginal e↵ects of natural disasters on leadership tenure when countries are
neither willing nor able, alternately willing and able, and both willing and able. Each
graph shows the e↵ect on leadership tenure if every country in the world held the
value of 0, 1 or 2. Several marginal e↵ects just miss significance at the .05 level and
are statistically significant at the .1 level. With regards to extreme temperatures,
if all countries in the world were alternately willing or able, the e↵ects of extreme
temperatures would decrease their tenure in o ce by 1.10 units. If all countries in
the world were both willing and able, floods would reduce leaders tenure in o ce by
.008 units. If all countries in the world were neither willing nor able, storms would
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Figure 3.2. Marginal e↵ects of independent variables
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decrease leaders tenure by .05 units. The e↵ect of epidemics is statistically significant
at the .05 level. If all countries were both willing and able, epidemics would decrease
leaders’ time in o ce by .01 units.
The most substantial marginal e↵ects come from the measure of global counts of
natural disaster events. More natural disaster events in the system account for a
decrease in leadership tenure across the three outcomes and are all statistically sig-
nificant at the .-05 level.
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Figure 3.3. Survival time time for leaders by willingness and ability
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Figure 3.3 shows the variation in baseline hazard for leaders at varying levels of
willingness and ability with covariates held at their means. 3 Leaders from countries
that are alternately willing and able have both the lowest and highest survival rate
in o ce. Leaders from countries that are both willing and able have a higher hazard
rate than those from countries that are neither willing nor able.
3.4 Conclusion and Future Work
Natural disasters a↵ect people, societies, leaders and states. This work demonstrates
that the tenure of leaders in o ce is sensitive to natural disasters, if only modestly.
The e↵ect that disaster events have on leadership tenure varies according to states’
willingness and ability. States prepare for and address the consequences of natural
disasters very di↵erently. This is in part due to the variation in provision of public
goods, like roads, levees and dams, and the protection of private property.
Leaders in autocracies and democracies are accountable to constituencies of signifi-
cantly di↵erent size, a↵ecting their willingness to prepare for and respond to natural
disasters. States’ ability to respond also varies according to their allocation of re-
sources to disaster preparedness and intervention. Previous scholarship has focused
primarily on conflict outcomes related to natural disasters, and civil war scholars
have provided tremendous insight into the conflict implications of natural disasters.
The work presented here extends the conversation beyond conflict to incorporate all
leadership transitions in the world system between 1960-2008.
3Future research will show the baseline hazard at other substantive values, i.e. when covariates
are held at their minimum and maximum values.
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While these e↵ects are modest, they represent a unique first attempt at quantifying
the e↵ects natural disasters have on the duration of leaders in o ce. Future work
should disaggregate the middle outcome of ‘1’ where countries are alternately willing
and able since there may be theoretically interesting information in each outcome
that disappears when added together. There is also modest support for the idea that
natural disasters in the international system a↵ect the tenure of individual leaders.
As the system is more taxed by the presence of natural disasters, individual leaders
may find themselves in increasingly precarious positions with regards to their time
in o ce.
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Chapter 4
HUMAN RIGHTS
4.1 Human rights and natural disasters
Protecting the human rights of people a↵ected by natural disasters can be a daunting
task for states. When natural disasters like floods or droughts happen, people ex-
perience their wrath, losing lives, livelihoods, homes and security. Natural disasters
disrupt the status quo, and create social, humanitarian and political needs. Social
safety nets that provide formal and informal utility are interrupted and destroyed.
In most cases, people turn to their governments to meet the needs they face. How-
ever, governments vary widely in their ability and willingness to provide for their
citizens, both in times of disaster and prosperity. Natural disasters create chaos, and
government agencies can face coordination problems that prevent them from provid-
ing immediate relief and humanitarian assistance to the a↵ected citizens. Often, the
most vulnerable members of society are those most a↵ected by and vulnerable to
natural disasters - those with the most precarious housing, fragile food supply and
tenuous financial safety nets.
87
Natural disasters stretch the institutional capacity of states and localities. States
that already struggle to protect human rights under normal circumstances may have
even greater di culty doing so under the increased social, economic and political
pressure resulting from natural disasters. Moreover, states that are disinclined to
protect human rights may find increased opportunities under the pretext of natural
disasters to oppress marginalized populations. In dealing with the e↵ects of natural
disasters, governments can select from a range of policy tools and options, and the
policy choice depends most on whether the government is democratic or not. Citi-
zens then may evaluate the outcomes of the government’s actions in response to their
needs arising from the e↵ects of the natural disaster.
Governments are often pressed to prepare for and respond to natural disasters. No
state is immune to the consequences of natural disasters, but some societies are bet-
ter equipped to cope with their e↵ects. Natural disasters a↵ect all societies, as it has
throughout history. The accelerated pace of occurrences of natural disasters is cause
for concern, given the rise in human populations and the increase in the number of
people likely to be a↵ected. Not all societies will be able to respond adequately to
the challenges posed by natural disasters, and states’ varying willingess and ability
contributes to the humanitarian outcomes that follow disaster events.
In January 2009, the United Nations Human Rights Council issued a report about
the e↵ects of climate and natural disasters on human rights (Knox, 2009). The re-
port identifies several key areas where human rights are likely to su↵er as a result
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of increased climate pressures on civilians within states. These include the right to
life, food, water, and housing. The report also identifies several especially vulnera-
ble groups, including women, children and elderly citizens, and religious, ethnic and
political minorities. I identify two ways in which states can violate citizens’ human
rights following natural disasters. First, natural disasters can create food insecurity,
depriving citizens of access to adequate nutrition. Second natural disasters destroy
structures and homes, and impede access to essential services like emergency shel-
ter. The following examples illustrate the problems of food insecurity and physical
displacement.
In 2010, massive flooding during monsoon season inundated the country of Pak-
istan, displacing more than two million people, placing more than one-fifth of the
country under water, destroying more than $4 billion (usd) of infrastructure and more
than $500 million in crop damage. The humanitarian consequences of the flood have
been devastating, sickening more than two million people from food-related illnesses,
malaria, diarrhea and snake bites.
Just a few years earlier in August 2006 along the Gulf Coast in the United States,
residents braced themselves for the impact of Hurricane Katrina. Some people fled
ahead of the storm’s impact, relocating briefly to other cities, staying with friends,
family and strangers, and still others moved to temporary community shelters, while
and some moved away permanently. Under the repressive regime of Kim Jong Il in
North Korea, farmers preferred to su↵er death under a crippling famine in the 1990s
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that reportedly killed more than one million people, rather than lobby the govern-
ment for assistance (Foster, 2011). The famine was caused in part by severe flooding
that destroyed crop storage facilities.
Why, though, should natural disasters give states the opportunity to violate hu-
man rights? Natural disasters disrupt the status quo. States’ baseline status quo
varies depending on the willingness and ability to prepare for and respond to natural
disasters. People living in states that are both willing and able should have better
human rights outcomes than people living in states that are neither willing nor able
or are alternately willing and able. At the most basic level, states violate human
rights when this option is less costly than other options, or when they lack the insti-
tutional capacity or incentives to protect them.
Davis & Seitz (1982) note that, “While societies generally possess adjustive mecha-
nisms to absorb disturbances that arise within or without their boundaries, disaster
situations are so radical that they cannot readily be handled by their usual means.”
State with the institutional or economic means to absorb the humanitarian, political
and social shocks caused by natural disasters are less likely to violate human rights.
States lacking the institutional capacity to cope with these shocks are more likely to
violate basic human rights.
4.2 Willingness and ability
As defined in Chapter Two, states are varyingly willing and able to prepare for and
respond to natural disasters. States that are most willing and able should have the
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best humanitarian outcomes since they have the political incentive to address their
constituents’ needs, and the capacity to meet citizens’ needs.
In the case of human rights, states’ willingness and ability plays an important role. 1
While democratic states should be more willing than non-democratic states to protect
political rights including ensuring protection from repression, all states are likely to
be vulnerable to compromising basic human rights following natural disasters. While
democracies should be more prepared and better able to intervene following natural
disasters, ensuring availability of food and housing can present many problems.
Flexible and responsive domestic institutions allow democracies to weather the ef-
fects of natural disasters. Collier & Hoe✏er (2005) specifically argue that govern-
ment type matters to a state’s strategy for dealing with resource conflicts through
domestic accountability to its constituents. In a democracy, legitimate governance is
ratified through widespread political participation, through active and competitive
recruitment of the executive o ceholder, o cial term limits, and the presence of
open elections. Governments calculate their disaster responses giving consideration
to their audience costs. Broad domestic audience costs like those characteristic of
democracies dissuade governments from pursuing policies that lead to human rights
violations.
1As previously defined, willingness is defined as a binary concept identifying whether a state is
democratic or not with an arbitrary cut point of +6 or higher on the Polity IV scale. Ability is
also a binary concept using the Relative Political Allocation measure developed by Kugler et al. A
state is defined as“able” if their annual political allocation score is above the global yearly mean.
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Mesquita & Siverson (1995), Mesquita et al. (2002), Mesquita et al. (2003) and
Clarke & Stone (2008) describe the composition of governmental coalitions in terms
of the selectorate and winning coalition. Bueno de Mesquita explains these terms as
follows:
“Nested within the residents of all polities is a selectorate and within
that there is a winning coalition. Leaders...maintain their coalitions of
supporters by taxing and spending in ways that allocate mixes of public
and private goods.”
In democracies, the size of the selectorate is roughly equal to the size of the winning
coalition. This means that popular vote installs leaders and removes them from of-
fice, and that leaders can earn favor with their constituents by providing public goods
to as many citizens as possible. In non-democracies, the winning coalition is much
smaller than the selectorate. While many people may have the ability to participate
in elections, the leader’s true power is maintained by privileging a small group of
supporters with private benefits. In non-democracies, leaders have a disincentive to
widely distribute public goods, since their tenure is contingent upon a much smaller
subset of individuals.
Governments vary in their provision of public goods. Because leaders of democratic
states are accountable to a large constituency, they have an incentive to distribute
public goods widely (Boix, 2001). These public goods may take many forms, like
investment in infrastructure, social services and security. Security as a public good
can be understood as protection from foreign and domestic threats, as well as the
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protection of human rights and respect for the basic human rights. Democratic
governments have stronger domestic institutions than do non-democracies which en-
courage the protection of human rights.
4.3 Hypotheses
There are three potential outcomes for states’ willingness and ability as they relate
to protection of human rights. States can be both willing and able, alternately wiling
and able, and neither willing nor able to protect human rights. States that are both
willing and able have the political mechanisms to ensure that protection is extended
to a large proportion of of society, i.e. those in the winning coalition, as well as the
ability to provide services and resources to their citizens.
States without willingness and ability are likely to have worse human rights outcomes
as they lack both the political institutions that ensure protection of human rights and
the means to provide them through preventive or compensatory measures. States
with either willingness and ability have mixed outcomes, since willingness without
ability may mean that human rights could be compromised through passive neglect,
or through deliberate denial of protection or provision of services.
One way to measure the protection of basic human rights is through the availabil-
ity of food and housing. By accounting for the quantity of nutrition measured in
kilocalories per person, we can better understand under what conditions natural dis-
asters are likely to deprive people of their right to adequate nutrition.
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Natural disasters are likely to a↵ect food security in several ways. First, when disas-
ters happen, they often interrupt the distribution of goods and supplies, destroy road
and electrical infrastructure which can cause food to spoil. Natural disasters also can
disrupt the production of food when they a↵ect growing cycles and destroy crops.
In non-democracies, violations of human rights may be more di cult to identify.
Hypothesis 1: An increase in natural disasters leads to a decrease in the availability
of food.
Hypothesis 2: As willingness and ability increase, the deleterious e↵ects of natu-
ral disasters on food availability decreases. Conversely, in states that are less willing
and able, an increase in natural disasters should have a large negative e↵ect on the
availability of food.
Hypothesis 3: An increase in natural disasters in the global system should have
a negative e↵ect on the availability of food.
When natural disasters happen, they often destroy homes and make areas unin-
habitable. Destruction of homes and regions can displace the people living there to
other locations within the state or across countries’ border to other locations creating
internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees. While states with lower levels of
willingness and ability are likely to have the problem of IDPs and refugees, countries
with higher levels of willingness and ability are not necessarily exempt from this
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phenomenon. While it is tempting to consider only cases like the several million
refugees and IDPs in places like Darfur, it is important to remember that after Hur-
ricane Katrina, nearly 400,000 people were displaced in the United States.
Displacement can happen quickly when a hurricane or storm makes landfall or flash
flooding during seasonal monsoons destroys a region, or it can happen gradually over
time as when people gradually move following recurring droughts.
States’ willingness and ability to accommodate the needs of displaced people varies.
It may be more di cult for people to move transnationally in states that are least
wiling and able, since non-democratic governments often make crossing borders dif-
ficult. In these cases, we are more likely to see internally displace people following
natural disasters. In states that are most willing and able, we should see few refugees
or internally displaced peoples. In states that are alternately willing and able, we
are likely to find more refugees seeking better accommodations in countries that are
more willing and able to o↵er assistance and protection.
Hypothesis 4: Increases in natural disasters should produce more internally dis-
placed people and refugees.
Hypothesis 5: In states that are least willing and able, an increase in natural disas-
ters should produce more internally displaced persons.
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Hypothesis 6: In states that are variably willing and able, an increase in natural
disasters should produce more refugees.
In the next section I turn to the data and empirical measurement of these hypotheses.
4.4 Data and Methods
To measure the availability of food, I use data from the United Nations Food and
Agricultural Organization (FAO) that measures average kilocalories per person by
country each year. To measure securing of housing I use data on refugees and inter-
nally displaced persons from the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR). Data
for natural disasters comes from the Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Dis-
asters (CRED), specifically the International Disaster Database. To capture states’
willingness I generate a binary variable for democratic and non-democratic states
using the Polity IV data. I use the arbitrary cut point of +6 to distinguish between
countries that are willing (‘1’) and and those that are not (‘0’). Results are robust
with cut points at +5 and +7.
To capture ability, I create a binary measure using data for Relative Political Allo-
cation (RPA) generated by Kugler et al. RPA is a scaled variable between 0 and 2
that incorporates states’ general public spending, technology, defense, public order,
economic a↵airs, housing, health, education and social security. 2States whose RPA
2Kugler et al. use the following formula to calculate Relative Political Allocation:
Income per capita = Technology⇥ (Capital/GDP)↵⇥ (GeneralPublic/cap) 1 ⇥ (Defense/cap) 2 ⇥
(PublicOrder) 3 ⇥ EconA↵air/cap) 4 ⇥ (Housing/cap) 5 ⇥ (Health/cap) 6 ⇥ (Education/cap) 7
⇥ (SocialSecurity/cap) 8
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score is below the annual global average are coded as not able (‘0’) and those with
scores above the annual global average are coded as able (‘1’).
The primary independent variables, extreme temperatures, droughts, floods, storms,
epidemics, and earthquakes, are derived from the CRED database. These variables
capture incidence of natural disasters, and number of people killed and a↵ected by
natural disasters measured in hundreds of thousands. Table 4.1 shows descriptive
statistics for all of the variables in the empirical models.
Table 4.1. Summary statistics of human rights variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Physical integrity 4.925 2.34 4255
Internally displaced persons 100 434.879 5977
Refugees 62.007 315.845 5869
Kilocalories per person 2547.746 526.093 6731
Drought 2.491 58.205 7851
Extreme heat and cold 0.117 8.708 7851
Flood 3.844 59.238 7851
Storm 0.983 16.721 7851
Epidemic 0.029 0.815 7851
Earthquake 0.202 6.05 7851
Willing and Able 0.934 0.674 6286
Global count of disasters 170.209 127.427 7851
Log of population 15.496 1.936 7513
Relative Political Allocation is the calculated as the ine ciency score between a state’s ideal spend-
ing in these areas versus actual spending. Thus, RPA = 2 ⇥ (1-(—Country i’s Ine cienty - Lowest
Ine ciency in Sample—/Country i’s Ine ciency + Lowest Ine ciency in Sample).
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4.5 Results and discussion
Table 4.2 reports the OLS regression results from three empirical models: the e↵ects
of natural disasters on nutritional intake (1. Food security), measured in kilocalories
per person; the e↵ects on creation of internally displaced persons (2. IDPs), and the
e↵ects on creation of transnational refugees (3. Refugees).
I turn first to the e↵ects of food security and natural disasters. Table 4.3 reports the
marginal e↵ects of each type of natural disaster. Under circumstances of extreme
heat and cold that a↵ect more than 100,000 people, the availability of food increases
in states that are neither willing nor able. Contrary to hypothesis 2, this is a curious
finding that runs contrary to the hypothesis, since food availability should decrease
in states that are neither willing nor able to feed their hungry citizens. It could be
that international humanitarian assistance accounts for this increase in kilocalories
per person.
The mean number of kilocalories per person for states that are neither willing nor
able is 2,332; the mean for states that are alternately willing or able is 2,522; and the
mean for states that are both willing and able is 2,771. Thus, while natural disasters
oddly raise the number of kilocalories per person in states that are neither willing nor
able, their nutritional baseline is still 15% below states that are both willing and able.
Droughts and floods have no statistically significant e↵ect on the caloric intake of
people in countries that are neither willing nor able, but they do decrease the number
of calories available to people in countries that are alternately and both willing and
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Table 4.2. Natural disaster e↵ects on aspects of human rights
1. Food security 2. IDPs 3. Refugees
Extreme heat and cold 130.5⇤⇤⇤ -23.01⇤⇤ -5.468
(11.34) (-2.92) (-1.37)
Drought -0.334 0.190 0.575
(-0.37) (0.39) (0.90)
Flood -0.0148 -0.0197 0.0247
(-0.14) (-0.52) (1.81)
Storm 0.380 -0.528 -0.313
(0.62) (-1.54) (-0.74)
Epidemic -586.7⇤⇤ 922.0 320.0
(-3.22) (1.22) (0.86)
Earthquake 7.942 -12.06⇤ -4.519
(0.83) (-2.15) (-0.80)
1 Willing and Able 220.8⇤⇤⇤ 46.79 41.24
(3.98) (1.56) (1.10)
2 Willingand Able 460.9⇤⇤⇤ -34.45 -24.35
(6.14) (-1.11) (-1.21)
Log of population 73.67⇤⇤ 35.35⇤⇤ 13.11
(2.87) (2.64) (1.42)
Global count of natural disasters 0.239 0.321⇤ 0.0156
(1.59) (2.39) (0.30)
1 (Willing + Able) ⇥ (Extreme heat and cold) -145.7⇤⇤⇤ 75.71⇤⇤⇤ 43.97
(-7.14) (6.67) (1.68)
2 (Willing + Able) ⇥ (Extreme heat and cold) -136.6⇤⇤⇤ 18.52⇤ 4.024
(-7.42) (2.55) (1.02)
1 (Willing + Able) ⇥ (Drought) 0.174 -0.165 -0.596
(0.20) (-0.34) (-0.93)
2 (Willing + Able) ⇥ (Drought) -0.0478 -0.239 -0.499
(-0.05) (-0.49) (-0.78)
1 (Willing + Able) ⇥ (Flood) -1.213⇤⇤⇤ -0.121 -0.211
(-4.62) (-0.70) (-1.95)
2 (Willing + Able) ⇥ (Flood) -3.949⇤⇤⇤ -0.0802 -0.177
(-5.11) (-0.17) (-1.31)
1 (Willing + Able) ⇥ (Storm) -4.987⇤⇤ -0.422 -0.920
(-3.13) (-0.37) (-1.11)
2 (Willing + Able) ⇥ (Storm) -8.771⇤⇤⇤ -0.314 1.121
(-4.66) (-0.36) (1.78)
1 (Willing + Able) ⇥ (Epidemic) 570.6⇤⇤ -917.1 -319.6
(3.13) (-1.21) (-0.86)
2 (Willing + Able) ⇥ (Epidemic) 580.5⇤⇤ -926.0 -324.4
(3.33) (-1.23) (-0.87)
1 (Willing + Able) ⇥ (Earthquake) -9.242 11.57⇤ 4.003
(-0.98) (2.12) (0.72)
2 (Willing + Able) ⇥ (Earthquake) -0.239 36.79⇤ 5.574
(-0.02) (2.23) (0.95)
Constant 1096.1⇤⇤ -544.4⇤ -173.6
(2.75) (-2.52) (-1.20)
N 4862 4557 4506
t statistics in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
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Table 4.3. Marginal e↵ects of natural disasters on food security
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able. The caloric reduction, however, is quite small. Epidemics, on the other hand,
reduce the caloric intake in countries that are neither willing nor able quite substan-
tially by nearly 600 kilocalories per person per year. Epidemics can be prevented
in many ways, including vaccinations and adequate waste management infrastruc-
ture. They can also be exacerbated by other natural disasters, including earthquakes,
floods, and extreme temperatures. Unlike earthquakes, however, states have ample
ways to prevent epidemics, including administering vaccinations, increasing health
care and waste management infrastructure capacity, and vector control strategies.
While I find support for both hypotheses 1 under some circumstances, I do not
find support for hypothesis 3 regarding the e↵ects of global natural disasters and
food security. There may still be reason to believe that natural disasters that occur
within the international system do a↵ect individual countries, but the mechanism
may be through food prices rather than actual caloric intake.
Table 4.4 presents the marginal e↵ects of natural disasters on the creation of in-
ternally displaced persons. Under the circumstances that all countries were neither
willing nor able, extreme temperatures would slightly decrease the number of inter-
nally displaced persons. If all countries were alternately willing or able, the number
of internally displaced persons would increase. Results are not statistically signifi-
cant for countries that are both willing and able. These results are what we would
expect, since freedom of movement may be di cult to achieve in unwilling states,
i.e. those that are non-democratic. Given these states are also unable to address
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the consequences of natural disasters, the humanitarian outcomes for people living
under these circumstances are likely to be quite poor. In states that are both willing
and able, extreme temperatures increase the number of internally displaced persons.
Table 4.4. Marginal e↵ects of natural disasters on internal displaced persons
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For states that are neither willing nor able, earthquakes slightly decrease the number
of internally displaced persons. It is possible that this outcome, similar to the de-
crease associated with extreme temperatures, could be attributed to compensatory
measures undertaken by the international humanitarian community to o↵set the dele-
terious e↵ects of natural disasters. This outcome warrants further exploration.
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Table 4.5. Marginal e↵ects of natural disasters on refugees
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Table 4.5 presents marginal e↵ects for the creation of refugees following natural dis-
asters. The results are similar to those found in the IDP model. For states that
are neither willing nor able, extreme temperatures have a negative e↵ect on the cre-
ation of refugees. This may be either due to the fact that unwilling, e.g. repressive,
non-democratic, regimes can make transnational movement di cult, or it could be
that the international community o↵sets the need to move by providing assistance
locally. In states that are alternately willing and able, the number of refugees in-
creases. Results for states that are both willing and able are statistically insignificant.
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From a policy perspective, these findings are important because they point to vul-
nerabilities in societies facing extreme temperatures, epidemics and flooding. States
that are the least willing and able may be most likely to receive the most attention
from the international community since their citizens’ circumstances are most dire.
However, the vulnerability of citizens’ to displacement is in countries that are alter-
nately willing and able. Contrary to popular assumption and to much attention in
recent political science literature, this phenomenon is not solely attributable to being
located on the continent of Africa. Many Central American, Eastern European and
Southeast Asian countries are included in this category as well.
4.6 Conclusion
Certain types of natural disasters have negative humanitarian consequences on dif-
ferent types of societies. This project takes the scholarship in a new direction to
explore the basic human rights consequences of climate disasters. From this project
we can learn several important things. Natural disasters do disrupt the status quo,
and they impair the provision of basic human rights like access to food and housing.
First, disaster type matters to human rights practices. As measured in the pre-
vious statistical models, many natural disasters do not have statistically significant
e↵ects on states’ human rights practices. This may be due to their relative infre-
quency, or to the general preparedness e↵orts that most states undertake, or due
to the fact that they a↵ect relatively fewer people than the other types of natural
disaster.
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Second, a state’s willingness and ability conditions how natural disasters a↵ect citi-
zens’ human rights. States that are least willing and able often have counterintuitive,
improved human rights e↵ects which may be a function of international humanitar-
ian intervention and the already low status of pre-existing humanitarian conditions.
States that are alternately willing and able seem to be the most vulnerable to hu-
manitarian consequences like decreased access to food and increased incidence of
internally displaced persons and refugees. States that are most willing and able ap-
pear largely impervious to the e↵ects of natural disasters.
While the e↵ect of global natural disasters do not play a prominent role in the
humanitarian consequences of local natural disasters, there is reason to suspect that
global natural disaster shocks matter to states in terms of their ability to secure food
supplies. Anecdotal evidence has pointed toward food price increases as sources of
discontent which motivated citizens to participate in the Arab Spring protests. Con-
necting food security to other political phenomena, like civil unrest and contentious
behavior, is explored in Chapter 5.
Future research can explore role that humanitarian aid plays in mitigating the neg-
ative e↵ects of natural disasters. Future research will also explore another extension
of human rights that includes active violation of political and civil rights. This line of
research posits that governments may opportunistically use natural disasters to sys-
tematically deny relief to minority groups, and may also use the ‘cover’ of the disaster
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to actively repress members of marginalized groups and violate their civil or political
rights, including torture, political imprisonment, disappearances and extrajudicial
killings.
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Chapter 5
CONTENTIOUS BEHAVIOR
As previously noted in Chapter Two, natural disasters a↵ect societies di↵erently,
conditioned on regime type. Natural disasters a↵ect people, and people in turn ex-
pect that their government will respond to their needs. Governments have many
options for responding and their policy choices are dependent on the number of
constituents to whom they are accountable, and on the institutions available for re-
sponding to natural disasters. State capacity describes the robustness of institutions
and economic capacity that matter to a state’s ability to respond to natural disasters.
People evaluate their government’s and their leaders’ responses to natural disasters.
Democratic states are characterized by regular, free and fair elections whereby a large
proportion of the constituency may evaluate their leaders’ performance. Democratic
states also protect civil rights, like freedoms of expression and assembly, which pro-
vide the opportunity for citizens to legally participate in demonstrations and protests.
Non-democratic states, on the other hand, may have irregular elections, or elections
for dictators with predetermined outcomes. The electoral process, in other words,
may be insu cient for citizens to express their approval or disapproval of leaders’
responses to natural disasters.
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Furthermore, freedoms of expression and assembly in non-democratic states are not
legally protected activities as they are in democratic states. Absent robust electoral
institutions, however, citizens may be left with protest behavior as their expression of
disapproval of leaders’ management of the natural disaster. While social unrest may
be present in both democracies and non-democracies, protests in the former tend to
be more formulaic and not destabilizing to the existing regime whereas protests in
non-democracies tend to have higher stakes.
How can we understand when and under what conditions citizens will exhibit con-
tentious behavior, given the presence of natural disasters? Following heat waves in
Pakistan, people protested at the electrical companies and at the capitol. New Or-
leans, Louisiana residents protested the perceived inadequate government response to
the disaster. Farmers in Birmingham protested against their government’s response
to drought conditions in 2012. In 2010, there were no protests, however, in Russia
following a severe heat wave.
If a government’s response is deemed su cient by citizens, no protest should be
necessary. However, an absence of protest could also indicate a repressive regime
which does not allow political space for protest. The presence of protest indicates
disapproval of the government’s response, but can have very di↵erent significance
depending on the type of society in which the protest occurs. Political institutions,
government type, and state capacity matter to the presence of protest in society.
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Along the lines of Eisinger (1973) and Francisco (1995), Fein (1995) assert a non-
linear relationship between social unrest and regime type. Fein innovates a useful
term - “More Murder in the Middle” - to describe where social unrest is likely to
happen. The theory predicts that semi-democratic states are more susceptible to
social unrest because of incoherent application of democratic practices. Paul Collier
describes the problems of this situation as an imbalance between instant elections and
weak checks and balances. When rules are applied inconsistently in non-democratic
states, social unrest is more likely and citizens’ rights are more likely to be violated.
We can extend this theory to the framework of states’ varying willingness and ability.
In states that are both unwilling and unable to prepare for or respond to natural
disasters, citizens might have ample reasons to want to participate in protest behav-
ior because of worsening humanitarian conditions or unequal provision of relief or
compensation. However, the political environment of unwilling states may limit citi-
zens’ ability to engage in contentious behavior as unwilling states are defined here as
being non-democratic. States that are most willing and able generally have the most
comprehensive disaster preparation and responses, and yet they are not immune
to contentious behavior. Protests, strikes and demonstrations in the most willing
and able states, while often constitutionally protected, is often unnecessary or less
prevalent because of existing formal, institutional processes for resolving grievances.
States that are either willing or able - but not both - are most likely to experience
the most protest.
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States that are alternately willing and able should experience the most protest. In
states that are willing but unable to adequately respond to natural disasters, citi-
zens may find themselves with the political mechanisms to hold leaders accountable
for inadequate response, but the depth of inadequate response can overwhelm the
system’s political capacity to correct for its lack of preparation or insu cient com-
pensation.
States that are unwilling but able might also face more protest because of the per-
ceived gap between what the government is capable of providing, and what they
actually provide. A government that is able to prepare for and respond to natural
disasters, but chooses not to, may face protests from citizens following natural disas-
ters. These circumstances are what Lichbach (1989) calls the “economic inequality-
political conflict” nexus, where relative deprivation and perceived inequality spark
protest. In these countries, governments are non-democratic and unwilling to ac-
commodate the needs many of their citizens. This is because they are not dependent
on a large proportion of their citizens for continued tenure in o ce. Under these
circumstances, most citizens are not part of the selectorate, the group of people re-
quired for leaders to remain in o ce, and as such leaders can deny preparatory or
compensatory services to large numbers of people with virtual impunity and little
risk of reprisal. They are likely, however, to privilege their much smaller group of
supporters with such provisions, an action which may provoke the ire of desperate
and needy masses. Under these circumstances, such desperation and need can pro-
voke protest behavior.
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This chapter examines sub-national contentious behavior. Many previous studies
linking natural disasters with political behavior have focused on dichotomous mea-
sures of conflict, like presence of civil war in a given year, or onset. However, to wage
a civil war, citizens must overcome collective action problems, secure weapons and
articulate grievances. On the other hand, staging a demonstration or protest against
government policies sets the threshold for action much lower. Thus while civil wars
are relatively rare events, protests and demonstrations happen much more frequently.
Natural disasters can create social unrest through a variety of mechanisms. They can
illuminate inadequate government institutions and disparities in society regarding the
implementation of government-sponsored relief and assistance programs. Leaders
may show demonstrate preferential treatment for some constituents and pay com-
paratively little attention to the needs of others. When aggrieved people decide to
voice their concerns between elections, their grievances may manifest in the form of
demonstrations and protests. The e↵ects of natural disasters on contentious behavior
is conditional on the type of government in the country where they occur and the
capacity of the state to absorb the disaster shock.
As weather patterns become more extreme and natural disasters occur with increased
frequency, we may also expect to see more contentious behavior from citizens. In-
creases in contentious behavior may be a function of increased opportunities to ex-
press grievances against governments and leaders. Since governments have a finite
111
amount of resources to spend on disaster mitigation and relief, their co↵ers may be
more quickly drained with an increase in the frequency, intensity and cost of these
events. In the United States, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
faced funding shortages following particularly weather-active seasons culminating
with the landfall of Hurricane Irene in 2011, and some local and state requests for
relief allocation have been denied.
Hypothesis 1: Increased incidences of natural disasters will increase contentious be-
havior in states that are alternately wiling and able.
Another way in which natural disasters may incite social unrest is when they af-
fect the availability and price of goods, specifically food. An increase in the number
of natural disasters happening worldwide can contribute to increases in the prices
of food. The e↵ects of natural disasters can travel long distances as well and af-
fect geographically separate regions. The international marketplace is increasingly
globalized and interconnected, with many countries dependent upon imports of food
and goods from remote places. When natural disasters destroyed wheat crops in
Australia and Russia in 2010, the global price of wheat increased.
People in lesser developed countries are more sensitive to increases in food prices, as
they tend to spend a greater proportion of their income on basic needs than people in
higher-income countries. Countries with large, diverse economies and robust politi-
cal institutions like those found in democracies should be more likely to weather the
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e↵ects of natural disasters with fewer instances of social unrest than non-democratic
countries dependent on primary commodities.
Hypothesis 2: Increases in the number of global natural disasters increases the inci-
dence of protest.
Natural disasters are occurring with increased frequency, which may contribute to a
corresponding increase in protest. Following Fein’s argument, non-democracies may
also be more likely to experience some form of unrest given their predisposition to
institutional inconsistencies. If citizens feel that elections do not resolve their needs,
or if they doubt the legitimacy of election results or are uncertain when the next
elections will be, they may be more inclined to take their grievances to the streets.
We should also consider that natural disasters are not all of one type, and that
some disasters should be more likely to create conditions for protest. For example,
in June of 1991, Pakistan experienced a serious heat wave which killed hundreds
of people. Some died as a result of heat-related illnesses and dehydration. Others
were a↵ected by secondary causes like food poisoning from unreliable refrigeration.
A continual lack of investment in the nation’s power grid taxed the capacity of the
electrical industry under the searing hot conditions, causing massive power outages
across the country. Violent protests in the port city of Karachi targeted the o ces of
the local electricity supplier and disrupted daily life by burning tires in the streets,
prompting a repressive response from local police. In the capital, the opposition
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party staged nonviolent demonstrations to highlight the current leadership’s short-
comings in responding to the humanitarian needs of Pakistani citizens.
The amount and timing of rainfall and extreme temperatures are exogenous events,
and yet even as such can create civil unrest in places like Pakistan when govern-
ments fail to provide relief. Secondary natural disasters are less perfectly exogenous.
Governments can mandate and facilitate vaccination programs which mitigate or
eliminate certain forms of epidemics.
Land-use policies to combat insect infestations, like draining swamps, have reduced
the incidence of malaria in developed countries. Governments may also implement
land-use policies to address secondary natural disasters like avalanches, landslides,
mudslides and subsidence. Countries dependent on primary commodities like tim-
ber often have unregulated harvesting practices whereby clear-cutting forests reduces
land cover, making mass movements of both wet and dry substances more likely.
The number of natural disasters occurring worldwide, and the numbers of people
that they kill and a↵ect, are both increasing. Yet if natural disasters are so severe
as to kill or injure large numbers of people, there may be few remaining people in
good health to e↵ectively mount protests. Thus, natural disasters, like droughts,
floods, storms extreme temperatures and earthquakes, which a↵ect people but do
not incapacitate them are likely to incite protests.
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Hypothesis 3: As a population is more likely to engage in contentious behavior
after natural disasters, protest behavior increases.
5.1 Methods and data
In this section I examine the e↵ects of natural disasters on contentious behavior and
social unrest for the time period 1960-2004.
Data for social unrest is taken from Bueno de Mesquita et al.,De Mesquita & Smith
(2010) who themselves derive the measure of contentious behavior from Arthur
Banks’ dataset Banks (2011). As the Bueno de Mesquita et al paper describes,
Banks’ derived his data on subnational contentious behavior, including demonstra-
tions, strikes, riots and revolutions, from news reports. BDM et al suspect that the
data is biased in two ways.
First, countries have di↵erent baselines for protest behavior, whereby some soci-
eties routinely experience protest, and for others it is a rare experience. Second,
press reporting varies between countries, which may cause over-reporting in some
countries and under-reporting in others. For this reason, BDM et al use a measure
that captures the change in protest behavior over three years, which allows each
country to have its own unique baseline level of protest. 1
1BDM et al. generate an index of mass political movements, i.e. demonstrations, riots, strikes
and revolutions. They then create a standardized version of the variable: z = (ln(1+x)mean(ln(1+
x)))/(standarddeviation(ln(1+x))). They then create an index by summing the four standardized
variables and dividing by four. Per their coding scheme, “The change-mass variable tells us whether
a leader faces an increasing or decreasing level of mass political movements. The use of the three
year lag is arbitrary.”
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Since this variable is continuous, I use ordinary least squares with robust standard
errors clustered by country. To measure natural disasters I use data from the In-
ternational Database at the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters
(CRED). I include extreme temperatures, droughts, floods, storms, epidemics, and
earthquakes as explanatory variables. I also include a variable to control for popula-
tion size (log of population) derived from World Bank World Development Indicators
data.
CRED follows specific rules for coding missing or unavailable data where zero does
not represent a value but rather means that no information is available. Information
about disaster events, including the numbers killed and a↵ected, comes from United
Nations agencies, governments, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red
Crescent Societies, and other various agencies Em-dat (2010). I followed the missing
data coding scheme instituted by CRED. However, in some cases, EM-DAT data
records the incidence of a natural disaster in a given year, but not information about
the number a↵ected. In this case, I extend their coding scheme to code the number
a↵ected as ”0” while retaining the information that indeed a disaster did occur. The
variables measuring the number of people killed and a↵ected by the various natural
disasters are measured in hundreds of thousands of people.
5.2 Results
Table 5.1 shows results from an Ordinary Least Squares regression, since the de-
pendent variable measuring contentious behavior is continuous. Table 2 shows the
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marginal e↵ects at the substantive values of states being both unwilling and unable
(coded ‘0’), states being alternately willing and able (coded ‘1’), and states being
both willing and able (coded ‘2’).
Table 5.1. Natural disasters and contentious behavior
Variable Coe cient (Std. Err.)
Extreme heat and cold -0.081⇤⇤ (0.029)
Drought -0.001 (0.002)
Flood 0.000⇤ (0.000)
Storm 0.000 (0.001)
Epidemic 0.074 (0.442)
Earthquake 0.028† (0.015)
Willing and Able -0.033⇤ (0.014)
Log of population 0.003 (0.004)
Global count of events 0.000⇤⇤ (0.000)
1 (Willing + Able) ⇥ (Extreme heat and cold) 0.130⇤ (0.053)
2 (Willing + Able) ⇥ (Extreme heat and cold) 0.069⇤ (0.031)
1 (Willing + Able) ⇥ (Drought) 0.001 (0.002)
2 (Willing + Able) ⇥ (Drought) 0.002 (0.002)
1 (Willing + Able) ⇥ (Flood) 0.000 (0.000)
2 (Willing + Able) ⇥ (Flood) 0.000 (0.001)
1 (Willing + Able) ⇥ (Storm) -0.004 (0.004)
2 (Willing + Able) ⇥ (Storm) -0.018⇤⇤ (0.002)
1 (Willing + Able) ⇥ (Epidemic) -0.097 (0.442)
2 (Willing + Able) ⇥ (Epidemic) -0.067 (0.446)
1 (Willing + Able) ⇥ (Earthquake) -0.031⇤ (0.015)
2 (Willing + Able) ⇥ (Earthquake) -0.051 (0.037)
Intercept 0.017 (0.068)
N 5047
R2 0.01
F (21,157) 26.443
The marginal e↵ect of extreme temperatures is statistically significant for states that
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are neither willing nor able, and states that are alternately willing and able. In states
that are neither willing nor able, the likelihood of contentious behavior decreases un-
der conditions of extreme heat or cold. In states that are alternately willing and
able, the likelihood of contentious behavior increases.
Figure 5.1 shows the marginal e↵ects of natural disasters on contentious behavior.
Droughts are likely to increase contentious behavior in states that are both willing
and able. Floods are likely to increase contentious behavior in states that are neither
willing nor able, and in states that are alternately willing and able. Storms are likely
to decrease protest behavior in states that are both willing and able, and have not
statistically significant e↵ect on the two other categories. Earthquakes are slightly
more likely to increase contentious behavior in states that are alternately willing and
able.
The results in some disaster categories are modest, but there is evidence that states
in the middle category where states are either willing or able are most vulnerable to
incidences of contentious behavior. Protest in states that are alternately willing or
able is likely due to awareness of unequal provisions of preventive or compensatory
measures to the selectorate, or due to the overwhelming e↵ects of the disaster(s)
which outpace the government’s ability to respond.
These results are important as they point to specific disaster phenomena and vul-
nerable government types. Natural disasters related to weather and geological phe-
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Figure 5.1. Marginal e↵ects of natural disasters on contentious behavior
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nomena are likely to increase contentious behavior in non-democracies and in states
that are under-prepared for them. This is especially relevant for policies related
to climate and weather, as patterns of these phenomena intensify and a↵ect more
people. While natural disasters a↵ect all societies, their negative consequences in
the form of contentious behavior disproportionately a↵ect non-democracies. Gov-
ernments can enact general preparedness policies to address contingencies related to
geological phenomena like earthquakes and volcanoes, but they have considerably
more control over policies related to weather and climate.
Governments can provide facilities for citizens seeking relief from extreme hot and
cold temperatures, and they can build levees and dams to mitigate flooding. Govern-
ments can provide for human and physical security during and after natural disasters,
and can provide compensation to their citizens for their losses. As other researchers
have demonstrated, leaders can reap rewards in extended tenure in o ce by providing
benefits to their constituency related to disaster relief (Achen et al., 2004; Healy &
Malhotra, 2009; Bechtel & Hainmueller, 2011). Leaders and governments can bu↵er
against destabilizing contentious behavior by enacting policies and cooperating with
other states and international agencies to better provide for their citizens.
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Chapter 6
CONCLUSION
This project represents an extension of the contributions made predominantly by the
civil war literature to the study of how the environment a↵ects political behavior.
I have examined the e↵ects of floods, droughts, storms, epidemics, extreme tem-
peratures, and earthquakes on other political phenomena, like the tenure of leaders
in o ce, the human rights consequences, and the sub-national contentious behavior
outcomes related to the presence of natural disasters.
This research distinguishes between states that are willing and able to prepare for
and respond to natural disasters. The theoretical distinction is important, given that
states must be both willing and able to address the consequences of natural disas-
ters in order to avert politically undesirable consequences, like a decrease in respect
for human rights, an increase in contentious behavior, and from the perspective of
leaders, a decrease in their time in o ce.
States that are democratic should be more willing, and states that are not demo-
cratic should be less willing to prepare for and respond to natural disasters. The
concept of willingness is derived from the di↵erent political mandates facing types
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of leaders. Since democratic leaders are accountable to a wider constituency than
are non-democratic leaders, they have a greater incentive to provide public goods
related to disaster prevention and mitigation.
The concept of ability refers to states’ economic and institutional capacity for re-
sponding to natural disasters. States that are able to address problems created by
natural disasters are characterized by large, diverse economies that can absorb the
economic shocks that disasters create. States that are unable to absorb these shocks
often are characterized by high rates of poverty, high social inequality, and economies
based on primary commodities, often agricultural, that make them particularly vul-
nerable to natural disasters.
States can be both willing and able, alternately willing and able, or neither will-
ing nor able to address the problems of natural disasters. States that are both
willing and able are least vulnerable to negative consequences. States that are nei-
ther willing nor able seem to be buoyed by external forces, as yet unexplored in this
context. Anecdotal evidence and other areas of political science research support the
idea that states that are neither willing nor able may be the most likely candidates
for international assistance. States in the middle, i.e. those which are either willing
but unable or unwilling but able, seem to be more vulnerable than states that lack
both willingness and ability.
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Future research will explore these two middle categories, disentangling their e↵ects
as separate and distinct political processes. It is possible that states which are will-
ing but unable, i.e. poor democracies, and states that are unwilling but able, i.e.
rich non-democracies, have separate and distinct political phenomena which warrant
separate categories. While this work classified them in the same category, future
work disaggregating them may provide more insight.
This project has shown that di↵erent types of natural disasters a↵ect political pro-
cesses in unique ways. I have also found some support for the idea that global natural
disasters a↵ect local political processes as well. Countries that are varyingly willing
and able to prepare for and respond to the demands that natural disasters create are
di↵erently a↵ected by natural disasters. Countries that are most willing and able are
least a↵ected by contentious behavior, have the most modest human rights e↵ects,
but the greatest e↵ect on leadership tenure.
In countries that are most willing and able, leaders are most vulnerable to shorter
tenures subsequent to floods and when there are more natural disasters happening in
the international system. Results for leaders in states that are neither willing more
able are statistically insignificant, but the hazard rates are in the expected (decreas-
ing) direction.
Countries that are least willing and able are oddly a↵ected by human rights, where
their food intake and food security issues improve with increased natural disasters,
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specifically extreme heat and cold. It is noteworthy that while this e↵ect is curious,
and statistically significant, the baseline caloric intake for citizens in states that are
neither willing nor able is lower than that of citizens in states that are alternately
and both willing and able. Droughts, floods, and storms also decrease food security.
In states that are alternately willing and able, extreme temperatures increase the
number of internally displaced persons and refugees.
Future work on the topic of contentious behavior should include event data analysis
of specific types of contentious behavior and natural disasters, as well as geospatial
coding or spatial econometric analysis of the phenomena. This work represents a
first attempt at quantifying the relationship between the presence of natural disas-
ter events which a↵ect and kill people throughout the world. As we have learned,
the presence and degree of social unrest in the form of protests, strikes and demon-
strations following natural disasters can vary depending on states’ willingness and
ability, and on the type of disaster.
While this dissertation represents an improvement in the ways we understand how
natural disasters a↵ect political behavior, much work remains to be done. Natural
disasters are demanding of political processes, and this work can provide a theoretical
foundation for future case studies involving leadership transitions, the relationship
between protest and disasters, and the humanitarian and human rights consequences
that natural disasters create.
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